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Master's Thesis

**ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЕ БРАЗИЛИИ И РОССИИ В РАМКАХ СТРАН БРИКС:
ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЕ И НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ**

**BRAZIL-RUSSIA POSITIONING WITHIN BRICS:
GLOBAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	3
CHAPTER 1	
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	8
1. THE UN, BRETTON WOODS AND SYSTEM POLARITY AFTER WORLD WAR II.....	8
1.2 CLAIMS BY EMERGING POWERS FOR MORE REPRESENTATION IN WORLD POLITICS....	10
1.3 CRITICIZED MECHANISMS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE.....	13
CHAPTER 2	
BRICS APPROACH TO THE REFORM OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE.....	18
2.1 BRICS IN TODAY'S WORLD.....	18
2.2 BRICS APPROACH TO MULTIPOLARITY AND MULTILATERALISM.....	21
2.3 BRICS VIEW ON THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL	23
2.4 BRICS VIEW ON THE BRETOON WOODS INSTITUTIONS.....	25
CHAPTER 3	
ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S AND RUSSIA'S POSITIONS ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE	29
3.1 BRAZIL'S/RUSSIA'S POSITIONS ON MULTIPOLARITY AND MULTILATERALISM	29
3.2 BRAZIL AND RUSSIA'S POSITIONS ON THE REFORM OF THE UNSC	35
3.3 BRAZIL'S/RUSSIA'S VISION ON BRETOON WOODS INSTITUTIONS	38
CONCLUSION	
BRICS' VIEWS <i>VIS-À-VIS</i> BRAZIL'S AND RUSSIA'S POSITIONS	42

INTRODUCTION

BRICS (the group composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) just recently completed 10 years of existence. However, despite representing a symbolic anniversary for this multi-continental political association whose inception was prompted by 2008's Financial Crisis, observers in the West affirm that «the differences between [...] [BRICS members] remain considerably greater than their similarities»¹, thus questioning the group's cohesion as an important factor in world politics and even its survival in the foreseeable future. The present research then sets out to investigate not only BRICS's view on international relations (IR), but also its compatibility with the national interests and political positions of two of its members, Brazil and Russia, when considered individually.

As far as analyses of BRICS documents are concerned, it is possible to highlight the following points concerning the group's view about IR:

- The world should be Multipolar, without any form of Superpower dominance within the system and global politics defined by different centers of economic, political and civilizational influence.
- The world order should be based on the rule of international law and traditional mechanisms of global governance become more representative of current day's realities, considering the increasing role of emerging economies.
- The architecture of financial governance should be reformed in order to empower developing economies, thus responsibilities and voting power at institutions such as the World Bank and especially the IMF should be rearranged.

With the aforementioned points in mind, our **Research Question** is then constituted as follows: “Does BRICS views on the current state of global governance and the emergence of multipolarity in world affairs coincide with Brazil's and Russia's national interests and aspirations in the system”? At first glance, Brazil and Russia do share some interesting similarities. During the early 2000s, both countries witnessed changes in their international status reflecting their economic growth, followed by - or concomitantly with - new leaders and political parties coming to power in those States, as in the cases of Vladimir Putin in Russia and the Labor Party's government in Brazil.

¹ Lieber, R.J. Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the problem of World Order. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p.80

Both also occupy a similar space in international trade as importers of manufactured goods (23% of Brazil's imports in 2017 were composed by machines², while the latter accounted for 30% of Russia's imports in the same year³), and providers of *commodities* to global markets (58% of Russia's exports in 2017 were composed by mineral products, especially oil⁴, while mineral products accounted for 20% of all Brazilian exports, particularly oil and iron ore⁵). Beyond their international trade profile, Brazil and Russia are also identified as 'continent-countries', due to their territory-size, alongside other States such as China, Australia, US, Canada and India. Moreover, the size of their populations and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are relatively comparable, and both States have abundance of natural resources⁶.

Nevertheless, although sharing a number of similarities, the proposed Research also tackles Brazil's and Russia's differences in terms of political status and aspirations in the international system, once their views on the current state of Global Governance and their understanding about concepts such as multipolarity derive from their self-perception within the system. Brazil, on the one hand, is overall not recognized as a 'Great Power', in the sense of being a State whose economic, political and military might enables it «to exert power over world diplomacy»⁷ while bearing 'special responsibilities' in the management of systemic affairs⁸. Moreover, the country «has never been able to match its territorial assets with military or economic might»⁹, which can be illustrated by the fact that although being the 5th biggest country in terms of territory (with roughly 5.6 % of the world's landmass)¹⁰, Brazil is only the 9th largest economy by GDP (with 2.09 % of the world's total), and devoid of nuclear weapons¹¹. Brazil, nevertheless,

² Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Brazil import? (2017). URL: <https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/all/show/2017/>

³ Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Russia import? (2017). URL: <https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/rus/all/show/2017/>

⁴ Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Brazil export? (2017). URL: <https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2017/>

⁵ Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Russia export? (2017). URL: <https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/all/show/2017/>

⁶ Leite, A.C.C; Lucena, A.M.M; Nobre, F.R.F. Russia's Geopolitics in the Anglo-American region: foreign policy and strategic alliance with Brazil (2005 and 2017). Rev. Bras. Est. Def. v. 6, n° 1, jan./jun. 2019

⁷ Flesmes, D. O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança? Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 2010, Vol. 53 (1), p.2

⁸ Waltz, K. N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979

⁹ Casarões, G. Itamaraty's Mission: Brazil's Ministry of External Relations, a Pillar of the Nation, Struggles Toward a "Democratic" Foreign Policy. Cairo Review, 2014, Vol 12, pp. 88-89. URL: <<https://www.thecaioreview.com/essays/itamaratys-mission/>>

¹⁰ WORLDOMETER. Largest Countries in the World (by area). URL: <<https://www.worldometers.info/geography/largest-countries-in-the-world/>>

¹¹ Brazil became signatory of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (a.k.a The Treaty of Tlatelolco) of 1967 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998, thus excluding the possibility of becoming a nuclear power. South America then became the largest nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world.

alongside other Regional Powers (such as India) believe «that the size of their territory and population, economic and military potentials [...] [indeed] qualify them for a higher status in the international system»¹², thus explaining the country's claim for a bigger voice in world affairs.

Russia, on the other hand, has been considered a Great Power since at least the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the 19th century, to the point of being labelled by other continental powers of the time as the “gendarme of Europe”¹³. Later in the 20th century, within the frameworks of the Soviet Union (USSR), the country managed to develop an impressive nuclear arsenal, thus achieving strategic parity with the United States during the Cold War, a condition that, among other things, elevated Moscow's status to that of a Superpower.

The **Relevance** of the aforementioned task, beyond attesting whether BRICS positions are in fact compatible with Brazil's and Russia's views about world affairs and global governance, is also reinforced by the necessity to assess BRICS cohesion as a political group really representative of its member-States aspirations. The **Novelty** of the present research consists in contrasting Brazil-Russia's positions while within BRICS with both countries' views, when taken individually, on issues ranging from the reform of today's structures of Global Governance to their understanding of multipolarity. The **Purpose** of the thesis is to compare the positions of Russia and Brazil, while within the frameworks of their BRICS cooperation, with their national interests and views in order to determine whether this interrelation is characterized by full compatibility or divergence.

The **Object** of the research is BRICS itself (discussed in Chapter 2), while our **Subject** is represented by Brazil's and Russia's positions in regard to their views on the global governance system and multipolarity (discussed in Chapter 3).

Our main **Tasks** in order to attain our purpose are described as follows:

- (1) To characterize global tendencies and views about the current state of Global Governance, the claims by emerging powers for more representation in world affairs and BRICS role within this debate (Chapter 1).
- (2) To demonstrate what BRICS declarations, reveal in terms of *multipolarity, the reform of the Security Council and necessary changes to Bretton Woods institutions* (Chapter 2)

¹² Sergunin, A. Theorizing BRICS: Critical Perspectives. In: International Legal Aspects of BRICS. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Editora D'Plácido, 2019, p.115

¹³ ИСТОРИЯ.РФ. На взятие Парижа: зачем Россия впервые стала жандармом Европы. URL: <<https://histrf.ru/biblioteka/b/na-vzatie-parizha-zachem-rossiia-vpiervyie-stala-zhandarmom-ievropy>>

- (3) To present and evaluate Brazil's and Russia's positions on the topics highlighted in Task 2 (Chapter 3).
- (4) To compare BRICS declarations to Brazil's and Russia's individual national interests, views and aspirations concerning the topics highlighted in Task 2 (Chapter 3).
- (5) To infer from Task 4 whether BRICS opinions are compatible/divergent with Brazil's and Russia's positions on the topics highlighted in Task 2 (Conclusion)

In terms of **Methodology**, we found to be best suited to answer our Research Question by using a qualitative/analytical approach to the investigation of documents (BRICS Summits' Communiques, Foreign Policy Concepts, G4's, IBSA's and RIC's declarations), and political discourses (by presidents, government officials and ministers) embedded within this thesis. Analyses of secondary sources include scholarly articles and opinion pieces from specialists on BRICS and on Brazilian and Russian foreign policies.

As for a brief **Literary Review** on topics pertaining to our Research, the present study was based on works in English, Russian and Portuguese languages, comprising both Primary and Secondary sources. As for the positions of Brazil and Russia concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), we made use of, from the Brazilian side, declarations from government officials, previous Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Presidents¹⁴, alongside G4's (*group composed by Brazil, India, Japan and Germany*) and IBSA's communiques. Through those sources, Brazil evidences the necessity of a significant reform for the UNSC, in order to turn this mechanism more representative of the current realities of world politics.

Secondary sources about Security Council reform include studies by Brazilian diplomats¹⁵, stating the necessity to turn the UNSC into a more representative organ by including countries from Latina America and Africa. From the Russian side, as primary sources, we relied mostly on declarations from officials and political figures¹⁶, as well as government documents substantiating Russia's concern about the scope of a possible UNSC reform¹⁷, postulating that the current permanent-members shall not lose any of their prerogatives. BRICS positions on this matter were extracted from the group's declarations, balancing at one side Brazil's (as well as India's) aspirations *versus* Russia's (and China's) concerns about keeping its status-quo at the UNSC.

¹⁴ Such as Celso Amorim, Mauro Vieira, Jose Serra and Presidents Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer

¹⁵ Such as Law Professor Pedro Sloboda

¹⁶ As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin

¹⁷ Represented by the Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation

On BRICS potential developments for the future, we made use of studies on the necessity to de-Westernize Global Governance; on BRICS' role in providing space for emerging powers in world affairs we consulted writings discussing the increasing regionalization of world politics and the rise of a polycentric international order¹⁸. On Brazil's foreign policy goals and its pursuit for recognition in world affairs we relied upon works by Brazilian intellectuals and historians¹⁹. On Russian foreign policy and its recent developments, we made use of important observations made by Russianists, Russian thinkers and Russia-based IR Professors²⁰. Concerning the necessity to reform the Bretton Woods institutions, we take into consideration as primary sources data on the evolution of Voting Share and Quota's allocation from the IMF and reports by IMF specialists about the changes on voting power of the G7 and emerging economies over the years; Brazilian and Russian criticisms about the slow pace of IMF quota reform are found within declarations by government officials and former Presidents²¹. BRICS' positions were once again extracted from the group's summit documents since 2009, which insisted on the necessity to give more voice and responsibility to emerging powers in managing financial global affairs.

Secondary sources on the necessity to reform Bretton Woods institutions include studies on the decline of Bretton Woods legitimacy by economist Luiz Gonzaga Belluzo, the decline of Western dominance in financial global governance by Amitav Acharya, and BRICS' strategy in face of the such changes by analysts Daniel Flemes and Russian Professor Maria Lagutina. As for Brazil-Russia common advocacy of 'multilateralism' and 'multipolarity/polycentricity' in IR, we found best suited to scrutinize governmental documents (such as Russia's Foreign Policy Concepts), declarations by Ministers, political actors and diplomats (on the Brazilian side). The **Conclusion**, beyond assessments delineated in Task 5, will also encompass some of the study's limitations as well as propose future lines of research. As for Chapter's **Structure**, the first Chapter provides an analysis about the elements of the current system of Global Governance, the second Chapter discusses BRICS positions (the Object of the thesis), while the third and last Chapter scrutinizes Russia's and Brazil's points of view (our Subject) alongside its comparison with BRICS declarations. Thus, the overall Research's path here undertaken will navigate from the Global (Chapter 1) to BRICS (Chapter 2) to the national (Chapter 3) levels of analysis.

¹⁸ By specialists Amitav Acharya, Brazilianist Daniel Flemes, Brazil-based BRICS specialist Oliver Stuenkel and Professor Maria Lagutina

¹⁹ *e.g.* Rubens Barbosa, Eugenio Garcia, Tullo Vigevani, Gabriel Cepaluni, Professor Guilherme Casarões, etc.

²⁰ Names include Angelo Segrillo, Alexandr Dugin, Maria Lagutina, etc

²¹ Such as Mauro Vieira (ex- Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs), former Brazilian president Dilma Rouseff, Sergey Lavrov and others.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

1.1 THE UNITED NATIONS, BRETTON WOODS AND SYSTEM POLARITY AFTER WORLD WAR II

After the end of World War II (in 1945), numerous International Organizations (IOs) emerged on the world stage, consisting of different forms, aims and principles. Since then, the pillars of global security and financial governance were represented by the *United Nations [UN]* and the *Bretton Woods institutions*. The Post-War order was based on the principle of 'Multilateralism', with countries working through international organizations on a rules-based cooperative framework, in order to mitigate the effects of power politics, as happened during the first half of the 20th century.

The UN was created to foster cooperation and peaceful relations internationally in accordance with the principle of the 'sovereign equality' of States, while openly discouraging «the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence»²² of any of its members. Its General Assembly enjoyed universal membership, while based on a "one country, one vote" system.

At the same time, however, the UN established a collective security framework through the *United Nations Security Council [UNSC]*, with five designated powers (the United States [US], Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China) working as "permanent members" with veto power over any resolution proposed in the Council. The UNSC is up until now the only UN organ endowed with the «primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security»²³, whose decisions are binding to all UN member States. All the 5 permanent members of the Council uphold a differentiated status *vis-à-vis* other UN members, since they concentrate decision-making about security matters of international significance. On this note, if in fact, as posited by Realists and Neorealists in International Relations' [IR] Theory, «institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world»²⁴, thus it might be fair to state that the collective security mechanism established within the UN became a reflection of the

²² UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. URL: <<https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/>> Art 1°, 1, 4

²³ *ibidem*, V, Art.24°

²⁴ Mearsheimer, J. The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, Winter 1994/1995 (Vol. 19, No.3), pp. 5-49, p. 7

designs of the victorious Allied Powers, represented by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The Breton Woods institutions, on the other hand, were founded in 1944 (even prior to the UN itself) with the aim to avoid the economic perils that ravaged the international system during the interwar period (1919-1939), and include *the World Bank* (initially named the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the *International Monetary Fund* [IMF] as the back-bone of the financial structure of global governance, providing «a multilateral framework of rules»²⁵ for the management of the international economy.

Currently, *the IMF* is composed by 188 member countries that contribute to the organization by making available part of their international reserves. Thus, whenever necessary, the Fund can allocate resources, by means of loans, to help countries facing deficits at their balance of payments, provided that they fulfill certain requirements/criteria established by the IMF itself in order to reorganize their economy. Countries with the biggest number of quotas at the IMF are also the ones with the biggest Voting Shares and therefore, capable of influencing the institutions' decisions and operations. The country with the biggest voting power at the IMF at the moment is the US, with 16.51% of the total vote's share.

Another branch of Bretton Woods, the *World Bank* has an organizational structure that also resembles that of the IMF, where voting power is distributed according to each country's participation as a guarantor of the Bank's capital. Currently, the countries with the biggest voting power are: the United States (with veto power in relation to any of the Bank's decisions), Japan, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and India.

In terms of *system polarity*, the international order during the whole of the Cold War (1947-1991) was effectively bipolar, with the Western alliance of States led by United States at one side and the Eastern alliance of States led by the Soviet Union at the other, both competing for supremacy globally. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world witnessed an undeniable and unchallenged *American predominance*, with the previously Bipolar world order suddenly changed to a Unipolar one based on the American hegemony. In fact, right after the end of the war, the privileged economical standing of the US *vis-à-vis* other European powers contributed to its leadership «in building a liberal international order [...] which has had remarkable staying power over time»²⁶, as commented by the Neorealist John Mearsheimer.

²⁵ Elias, J; Sutch, P. *International Relations: The Basics*. New York: Routledge, 2007, p.87

²⁶ Mearsheimer, J. *The Rise & Fall of the Liberal International Order*. 2018, p.2 URL: <https://ndisc.nd.edu/assets/288231/rise_and_fall_of_the_liberal_international_order.september_11_2018.pdf>

Nevertheless, since early 2000s, many countries around the world started to oppose certain aspects of the American hegemony, in particular the unilateral militarism prevalent during George W. Bush's administration (2001-2009), which, alongside the 2008 Financial Crisis also originated in the US, became important factors in bringing together *emerging countries*, willing to defend concepts such as 'multilateralism' in global affairs and the diplomatic (instead of militarist) solutions to acute international crises.

Political scientists would write about the 'end of Unipolarity' «and with it the illusion that other nations would simply take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order»²⁷, which brings us to the current scenario discussed throughout our Research, an order characterized by an ascension of new powers. Nowadays, as argued by some, the United States is no longer able «to create the rules and dominate the institutions of global governance²⁸ and world order in the manner it had for much of the post-World War II period»²⁹, due to the rise of different centers of power within the system. Changes in the international distribution of economic and military power caused the so-called *emerging States* [or emerging economies] to play a more active role in world politics. The term 'emerging', by its turn, comes from the understanding that some States, once seen as 'peripheral' within the system, have now improved their economic standing, elevating their status *vis-à-vis* traditionally established powers³⁰. The next section will thus be dedicated to discussing emerging powers' claim for more voice in global decision-making.

1.2 CLAIMS BY EMERGING POWERS FOR MORE REPRESENTATION IN WORLD POLITICS

By the 1970s, the basis of the Bretton Woods system had weakened and the liberal vision of international management led by the US and its Western allies started to instigate dissidence among less-developed countries of the globe, whose view was that the open monetary

²⁷ Allison, G. The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers. Foreign Affairs: 2020. URL: <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence>>

²⁸ The concept of Global Governance chosen for our Research is that of activities «backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities» as defined by Rosenau in 1992. Rosenau, J; Czempiel, E. Governance without government: order and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992

²⁹ Acharya, A. After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order. Ethics & International Affairs, 31, no. 3 (2017), p. 277.

³⁰ Lima, M.R A Política Externa Brasileira e os Desafios da Cooperação Sul-Sul. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 48, no. 1 (Janeiro-Junho): pp. 24–59. Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais. Brasília: 2005. <<http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=35848102>>.

and financial systems of global governance worked to perpetuate their underdevelopment and dependence to the developed countries³¹.

In the 1980s developing nations in debt were pressured by industrialized States through the IMF making «international aid dependent on neoliberal-style adjustment measures [...] [meaning] primarily reducing public spending [...] privatization of State-owned enterprises; the floating of exchange rates; price decontrols; fighting inflation; and reducing tariff barriers on imports»³² policies which caused, collaterally, many countries to face acute economic domestic instability and eventually declare moratory on their debt.

During the 1990s, multilateral institutions of global governance were under the uncontested leadership of the United States, which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, experienced a Unipolar *momentum*, in a time where international analysts, such as Francis Fukuyama, announced triumphantly ‘The End of History’. The then so-called Washington Consensus, concerning *fiscal discipline, market deregulation, privatization of State assets, financial and trade liberalization* etc, had whole continents such as South America witness «less growth [...] in per capita GDP than in 1950–80, despite the dismantling of the [previously] State-led, populist, and protectionist policy regimes of the region»³³, followed by economic depression, inflation and social instability in many countries.

With the coming of the 21st century, however, the so-called emerging countries started to challenge the «framework that has underpinned the post-war order»³⁴, seeking to improve their decision-making authority in various mechanisms of global governance. Due, in part, to the dramatic changes in the context of global development in recent decades, many emerging economies have industrialized and urbanized at a pace never seen before in human history³⁵, and as a result, claims for a bigger voice and representation in the institutions created after World War II became a common place in world politics. In other words, «to reconfigure rights and responsibilities in existing institutions to reflect the diffusion of power in an increasingly multipolar world»³⁶ should be the goal of the current order, affirms John Ikenberry.

³¹ Tkachenko, S. International Political Economy. In: Tsvetkova, Natalia (Ed.), Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations, Lexington Books, 2017, pp.79-102

³² *ibidem*

³³ Rodrik, Dani. Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006), pp. 973–987, p.975

³⁴ Acharya, A. After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order, p. 275.

³⁵ NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 – 2021. URL: <<https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/NDB-Strategy.pdf>>

³⁶ Ikenberry, G. J. The End Of Liberal International Order?, p. 23

Today, both the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions face acute problems of legitimacy, considered by many countries as being ‘too Western-centric’ (a critique especially directed towards the IMF and the World Bank) and unrepresentative of the current distribution of power (above all economic) in international affairs. For some analysts «the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF all work hard to legitimate themselves with claims for the moral virtue of what they do [...] But when others doubt the intent and sincerity of these actors, accusations escalate from mere incompetence to deceit and hypocrisy»³⁷, which has often being the case when it comes to many States’ grievances towards the somewhat unfair configuration of the international system. In addition to the aforementioned, we might as well add the limited mobility of States within the system and the difficulty of existing institutions to properly integrate emerging powers³⁸ in their processes of decision-making.

With the old US-led Post-War order giving way to a more multipolar configuration of power, some started to speak about a ‘crisis of transition’³⁹, represented by new coalitions of States (such as BRICS) and new governance institutions (*e.g* the New Development Bank). In fact, after the Financial Crisis of 2008, not only globalization (in general), but also the financial governance of the system⁴⁰ (in particular) started to be contested, prompting emerging economies to coordinate themselves in order to avoid further financial instability in the future. Russian professor Maria Lagutina affirms for instance that «the Financial Crisis laid the foundations for the transformation of the world order and the redistribution of power centers in its structure: from the North and the West to the East and the South»⁴¹, with the East and South represented by emerging and vibrant economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

During the 2000s, moreover, rising *non-western States* began to claim for a greater voice in global governance⁴² mechanisms, making the overall system «less US and Western-centric»⁴³ and more representative of their augmented economic as well as political importance. While some affirmed that the decades-old traditional system of global governance suited in fact

³⁷ Finnemore, M. Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be. Princeton University: World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 58–85, p. 74

³⁸ Stuenkel, O. O Mundo Pós-Occidental: Potências Emergentes e a Nova Ordem Global. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2018, 1º Edição

³⁹ Ikenberry, G. J. The End Of Liberal International Order?, p. 8

⁴⁰ Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions. URL: <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23802014.2019.1643781?needAccess=true>>

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p.5

⁴² *ibidem*

⁴³ Acharya, A. Global Governance in a Multiplex World. European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2017, p. 16

«the power and purpose of the US and the West»⁴⁴, emerging powers tried to coordinate themselves and to manifest their dissatisfaction about such a state of affairs in world politics. If, as affirmed by the Neo-Realist Kenneth Waltz in his 1979's *Theory of International Politics*, «a legitimate international order tends toward stability and peace»⁴⁵, one comprehends why matters such as 'legitimacy' and perceptions about a 'legitimate world order' are at the top of the political agenda for rising powers.

Analysts state for instance that «Western universalism is slowly being replaced by the new characteristics of the emerging world order»⁴⁶, pointing out to the rising of a multipolar scenario in international affairs. Indeed, «one of the leading trends in world politics today is the growing number of countries with some degree of status dissatisfaction»⁴⁷, with transitions in economic power prompting some States to challenge the status quo⁴⁸. *But what examples there are about insufficient legitimacy and/or lack of representation concerning current institutions of global governance?*

1.3 CRITICIZED MECHANISMS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

One such criticized mechanism is the *UN Security Council* [UNSC], perceived as a non-legitimate mechanism of global governance due to its oligarchic structure, and generating «repeated demands by many countries for a comprehensive and inclusive reform»⁴⁹ to expand both the permanent and non-permanent seats. The Council's composition, for some, represents «the unequal power relations that exist between States»⁵⁰, with its limited permanent-membership *de facto* restricting the management of world security affairs⁵¹ within the hands of a few powers. As stated by Finnemore «the United Nations cannot exist without this concession to power

⁴⁴ Acharya, A. *Global Governance in a Multiplex World*, p. 10

⁴⁵ Waltz, K. N. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p.63

⁴⁶ Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions. *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal*, 2019. URL: <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23802014.2019.1643781?needAccess=true>>, p.1

⁴⁷ Mazarr, M J *et al.* Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, p.20. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html>

⁴⁸ Çiftci, O. Neoliberalism on Regional Conflicts. *TUIC Academy*: 2019. URL: <http://www.tuicakademi.org/neoliberalism-on-regional-conflicts/?fbclid=IwAR32z8TdkqnagpoNWPE1fP_fUluFyfBzc8sL-EqfJcnagro0m4stWASCPME>

⁴⁹ «A atual estrutura oligárquica do Conselho de Segurança [...] tem gerado repetidas demandas, por parte dos mais diversos países, por uma reforma ampla e inclusiva» (original quotation in portuguese) Sloboda, P.M; Val, E.M. Revisitando o Novo Multilateralismo Latino-Americano e seu Impacto na Reforma do Conselho De Segurança Das Nações Unidas. *Revista Vía Iuris*, 2015, Vol. 18, p.187. URL: <http://190.242.99.229/index.php/ViaIuris/article/view/587/pdf_40>

⁵⁰ Elias, J; Sutch, P. *International Relations: The Basics*. New York: Routledge, 2007, p.86

⁵¹ Vigevani, T; Cepaluni, G. *A Política Externa Brasileira: A Busca pela Autonomia, de Sarney à Lula*. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2016

asymmetries»⁵² which does not necessarily mean that all States approve the decisions taken by the Council's 5 permanent-members. Without representation for both Africa and Latin America for instance, the balance that equates power and legitimacy will remain mismatched⁵³ and the UNSC illegitimate in the eyes of many countries. When one looks for instance at the percentage of UNSC permanent members in relation to all UN member-States throughout history, it becomes clear that the overall representativity of that mechanism has diminished over time (see ATTACHMENTS).

Regarding the *Bretton Woods institutions*, «the most institutionalized and rule-governed component»⁵⁴ of the post-war period, its branches represented by the IMF and the World Bank are frequently criticized as being instruments «used by rich industrialized countries to control poorer ones [...] shoring up an economic system that benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor»⁵⁵, a claim that has everything to do with many countries' grievances towards those institutions.

On the one hand, criticized for representing a financial institution used to persuade less-powerful countries into opening their economies through policies of *deregulation, privatization and accepting external interference in their internal affairs*⁵⁶, for many years *the IMF* «forced States in the developing world to cut welfare spending in favor of debt repayment», while arguing that these policies were intended to bring prosperity to developing nations. However, IMF specialists reported that the organization had in fact «seriously underestimated the perils of financial liberalization, both domestic and external»⁵⁷ and memories related to IMF dependency and debt repayment have instigated anti-IMF sentiments in many countries in the global south, with the institution being sometimes even equated to American imperialism. A renowned Brazilian economist writes for instance that «the problem of the IMF is not its excessive

⁵² Finnemore, M. Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be. Princeton University: World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 58–85, p. 62

⁵³ Sloboda, P.M; Val, E.M. Revisitando o Novo Multilateralismo Latino-Americano e seu Impacto na Reforma do Conselho De Segurança Das Nações Unidas, p.182. URL: <http://190.242.99.229/index.php/Vialuris/article/view/587/pdf_40>

⁵⁴ Mazarr, M J et al. Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives. RAND Corporation: Research Report, RR-2726-AF, 2018, p.21. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html

⁵⁵ Elias, J; Sutch, P. International Relations: The Basics, p.88 and 164

⁵⁶ Cooper, R. The Post-Modern State and the World Order. London: Demos, 1996

⁵⁷ Wolf, M. Today and Tomorrow: To meet future challenges, the IMF must have strong backing from its members, p.7. IMF: Finance & Development, 2019. URL: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/06/pdf/the-future-of-the-imf-wolf.pdf>

power, but its deplorable submission to the [...] interests of the United States»⁵⁸, a point of view that is representative of the suspicion held towards that institution.

Additionally, the amount of voting shares enjoyed by the US and a handful of Western allies at the IMF is considered to be one among «numerous examples of U.S. predominance in rule-making bodies that have given the United States competitive advantage»⁵⁹ providing Americans with the utmost authority about how the organization operates. In terms of Quotas/Voting Shares the US is slightly overrepresented at the IMF in comparison to the country's share of Global GDP by PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), while slightly underrepresented when it comes to its share of nominal Global GDP (see ATTACHMENTS). However, together with countries of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), the overall Western dominance at the IMF becomes evident. All other Western countries (but the US) are overrepresented in their Quotas/Voting Shares at the IMF in comparison to their share (in %) of Global GDP by PPP as well as nominal Global GDP.

The G7 currently has 41.2% of the Voting Shares at the IMF (before 2010's Quota Reforms this percentage was 43%), while BRICS countries, on the other hand, now hold some 13.54%; the most significant increase after 2010's Quota Reforms came from China, whose voting power went from 3.8% to 6% after 2010⁶⁰ (see ATTACHMENTS). *Non-Western countries* such as China (in particular) and India are both underrepresented in terms of Quotas/Voting Shares at the IMF in comparison to their actual share of Global GDP by PPP (see again ATTACHMENTS) and nominal Global GDP. This comparison regarding shares and quotas at the IMF between the Western and non-Western countries is important because differently from the UN General Assembly for instance, where decisions follow the 'one-country one-vote' principle, «the IMF follows a corporative decision-making model»⁶¹, therefore the US, in particular, and the G7, more generally, hold a managerial advantage at the institution.

In view of the afore-mentioned, during early 2000s, as many States lifted themselves from debt (as Brazil and Russia) and economic instability, the world that surrounded the IMF

⁵⁸ «O problema do FMI não é seu poder excessivo, mas sua deplorável submissão ao poder e aos interesses dos Estados Unidos» (original in portuguese). Belluzzo, L.G. O declínio de Bretton Woods e a emergência dos mercados "globalizados". *Economia e Sociedade*, 2016, Vol. 4, n. 1, pp. 11-20

⁵⁹ Mazarr, M. J *et al.* Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, p.23. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html>

⁶⁰ IMF [INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND]. Quota and Voting Shares Before and After Implementation of Reforms Agreed in 2008 and 2010 (In percentage shares of total IMF quota). URL: <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf>

⁶¹ MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. International Monetary Fund. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/sem-categoria/6435-international-monetary-fund>>

changed, which was characterized by «a shift in global economic, and therefore political, power»⁶², setting the stage for emerging economies to voice their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. Some, by its turn, associate this shift in global [economic] power to the rise of the so-called *revisionist States* which aspire (among other things) to «increase their relative power, status, and voice in the system»⁶³, an interpretation frequently associated to the BRICS countries since its's formation in 2009.

Thus, as many countries emerged economically during the last decades, they also contested the Western (an ultimately American) hegemony prevalent within the system since the 1990s. Moreover, the United States has, since early 2000s, ignored numerous international agreements, regimes and political commitments that affected in any way its capacity for unilateral action⁶⁴. Nevertheless, as Neorealists put it «the American aspiration to freeze historical development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed [...] the very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine it. The effort to maintain dominance stimulates some countries to work to overcome it»⁶⁵, which can be seen through the efforts of emerging countries to reach political concertation.

Overall, as reminded by Barnett and Duvall, «institutions established at one point in time [such as the UNSC, the World Bank and the IMF] can have ongoing and unintended effects [such as lack of legitimacy and resistance to change] at a later point. Long-standing institutions represent frozen configurations of privilege [as in the cases of veto power enjoyed by the 5 permanent-members of the Security Council or the Western dominance in global financial institutions]»⁶⁶ limiting the choices of other States within the system. *Structural power*, as those embedded within the Security Council and within Bretton Woods institutions, shapes actors' self-understandings⁶⁷, whereas privileged members of the international community believe they are the only ones entitled with dealing with matters of 'global' significance.

⁶² Wolf, M. Today and Tomorrow: To meet future challenges, the IMF must have strong backing from its members, p.5. URL: <<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/06/pdf/the-future-of-the-imf-wolf.pdf>>

⁶³ Mazarr, M. J *et al.* Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, p.16. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html>

⁶⁴ Fiori, J.L. Formação, Expansão e Limites do Poder Global. Rio de Janeiro: 2004, p.42. URL: <<https://pt.scribd.com/document/155130423/09-FIORI-Jose-L-Formacao-Expansao-e-Limites-do-Poder-Global-pdf>>

⁶⁵ Waltz, K. Structural Realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41, p.37

⁶⁶ Barnett, M; Duvall, R. Power in International Politics. *International Organization*, Vol. 59, Winter 2005, pp. 39–75, p.51

⁶⁷ *ibidem*

This thought, however, is not shared by States that feel dissatisfied about the overall state of affairs and their lack of representation and voice in decision-making processes inside the system. Whereas structural power generally «envision[s] hierarchical and binary relations of domination that work to the advantage of those structurally empowered»⁶⁸, States located at the outer rings of ‘power’ feel justifiably underrepresented and alienated within institutions whose resistance to change leads ultimately to a ‘crisis of legitimacy’.

Naturally, «when governments are unhappy with the *status quo*, they will enact new policies in an attempt to improve their condition»⁶⁹, an observation that accurately represents the actions undertaken by Brazil, China, India and Russia when establishing the group BRIC(S) after the 2008’s *Financial Crisis*. What might as well explain the formation of the BRICS’s arrangement is each member’s individual grievances towards, at one point or another, the American and/or Western hegemonism in world affairs. The BRICS association, therefore, works as a strengthened political platform for the 5 States that compose it, in order to stand in better conditions to defend their common interests.

Brazil and Russia, the two countries most closely scrutinized in this thesis, had their own political grievances and uncomfortable situations associated with the West and/or with the Western-dominated institutions of global governance. Brazil, on the one hand, during the 1980s and 1990s, was in notable indebtedness to the IMF, which jeopardized the country’s national autonomy and deepened its dependency on international creditors, bringing about reflections about the acute dichotomy between North and South, developed and developing countries.

Russia, by its turn, while a non-participant in the institutions tailored by the West during the Cold War, became fully integrated in those same institutions from the 1990s onwards after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, for Russia a constant sense of estrangement stemming from decades of opposition between East and West is yet not completely overthrown, due to decisions taken by both the United States and Europe, in a Post-Cold War context, without taking into consideration Moscow’s national interests, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s.

That being said, both Brazil and Russia would voice their dissatisfaction about the perceived inadequacies of the current state of world affairs through BRICS, a group whose views and positions on the main institutions of global governance is the theme of our next Chapter.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 56

⁶⁹ Berejikian, J.D. Model Building with Prospect Theory: A Cognitive Approach to International Relations. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec, 2002), pp. 759-786, p.771

CHAPTER 2

BRICS APPROACH TO THE REFORM OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

2.1 BRICS IN TODAY'S WORLD

An example of emerging economies' coordination with an aim to improve their position within the international system is represented by the BRICS group (established in 2009 after the Financial Crisis), composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The original acronym BRIC stemmed from a paper by the economist Jim O'Neill (of Goldman Sachs) in 2001, advising investors to pay more close attention to those emerging economies in terms of future and reliable investments. By that time, during the first decade of the 2000s, all BRIC countries were growing at a fast pace; as an example, from 2000 to 2007, BRIC States exceeded 5% GDP growth in average, with China, by its turn, reaching almost 15%⁷⁰ GDP growth in average during the period.

With the inclusion of South Africa in 2011 BRICS attested the tendency in world politics «toward convergence and interaction of States located thousands of kilometers away from each other»⁷¹ with the group containing members from 4 out of the 7 world continents: Asia (China, India and Russia), Europe (Russia), South America (Brazil) and Africa (South Africa). BRICS «common aversion to the dominant power of the G7, [and] particularly the United States»⁷² motivated the group to look for ways to shift the current system of global governance, away from a Western-centric model to a more inclusive arrangement⁷³, where emerging countries can play a greater role in decision-making.

BRICS, on the one hand, defines itself as «an important force for incremental change and reform of current institutions towards more representative and equitable governance»⁷⁴, representing as of today 41,5 % of the world's population *vis-à-vis* G7's 9, 98%⁷⁵. In regard to

⁷⁰ Гиаккаглини, Ф. Д. В. Перспективы развития БРИКС после саммита в Форталезе: политико-экономическое положение стран-участниц. Государственное управление. Электронный вестник, 2014, № 46, pp.226-258. URL: <http://ee-journal.spa.msu.ru/vestnik/item/46_2014giaccaglini.htm>

⁷¹ Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2019. URL: <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23802014.2019.1643781?needAccess=true>>, p.51

⁷² Cynthia, R; Armijo, L; Katada, S. The BRICS as a club. In: Cynthia, R; Armijo, L; Katada, S. The BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, p.1

⁷³ Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions, 2019

⁷⁴ BRICS. Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration. India: 2012. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>>.

⁷⁵ WORLDOMETER. Countries in the world by population (2020). URL: <<https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/>>

BRICS classification, some posit that the group falls into the category of *reformist States*, defined by their dissatisfaction «with the West's geopolitical and geoeconomical dominance in the world»⁷⁶, while attempting to complement existing structures of global governance⁷⁷. Indeed, as stated by a Brazil-based specialist on BRICS «none of the group's proposals question the basic rules and norms that underpin today's global order, and the legitimacy of key institutions, such as the UN Security Council, is not questioned»⁷⁸, thus prompting an understanding of BRICS not as a force of disruption, but of reasonable and necessary reform of the current state of affairs in the international system.

BRICS major objectives, according to another point of view, concern «the promotion of a shift from the paradigm of a Western-dominated system of global governance to a more inclusive [one]»⁷⁹, where emerging countries, as represented by Brazil, China, Russia and India, can play important roles in global decision-making. Western media, on the other hand, accuses BRICS of being «an unwelcome challenge to the established world order as defined by the US-dominated UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank»⁸⁰, an understanding that goes in line with the interpretation of BRICS as a potential threatening force to the preeminent position of the West in the international arena⁸¹. Be it as it may, so far BRICS, in the words of Russian professor Maria Lagutina, contends against «the hegemonic nature of the current world order and the unfair structure of the world economic architecture»⁸², as demonstrated by the group's positions in all its Summits and Declarations.

For Russia in particular, BRICS's inception was based on the ideas of the renowned diplomat Yevgeniy Primakov (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 1998 and Prime-Minister between 1998 and 1999), whose doctrine postulated that Russia's national interests on the international arena should be achieved not only with the West's help, but by establishing partnerships with *Asian (and non-Western) emerging powers* such as China and India⁸³. Primakov

⁷⁶ Sergunin, A. Theorizing BRICS: Critical Perspectives. In: International Legal Aspects of BRICS. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Editora D'Plácido, 2019, p.102

⁷⁷ Stuenkel, O. BRICS e o Futuro da Ordem Global. São Paulo: Paz e Terra

⁷⁸ «Nenhuma das propostas do grupo questiona as regras e normas básicas que sustentam a ordem global de hoje, e a legitimidade de instituições-chave, como o Conselho de Segurança da ONU, não é questionada» (original in portuguese). *ibidem*, p. 182

⁷⁹ LAGUTINA, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2019. URL: <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23802014.2019.1643781?needAccess=true>>, p.5

⁸⁰ Tisdall, S. Can the BRICS create a new world order? The Guardian: 2012. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/29/brics-new-world-order>

⁸¹ Sergunin, A. Theorizing BRICS: Critical Perspectives. In: International Legal Aspects of BRICS. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Editora D'Plácido, 2019, p.118

⁸² Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions. 2019, p.8

⁸³ Куприянов, А. Прагматичный реалист: почему доктрина Примакова актуальна и сейчас. Izvestia: 2019. URL: <https://iz.ru/937080/aleksei-kupriyanov/pragmatichnyi-realist-pochemu-doktrina-primakova-aktualna-i-seichas>;

made it clear «that the American-led unilateralism in international politics is unacceptable to Russia»⁸⁴, and thus Moscow explored the formation of an Eastern bloc, facilitating the opposition to the Western (and ultimately American) hegemony in world affairs⁸⁵. For Russia, moreover, BRICS reflects a trend «towards the formation of a polycentric system (see point 3.1, Chapter 3) of international relations»⁸⁶, setting the group as a platform for cooperation between States dissatisfied with their position and voice in global decision-making.

In short, BRICS is important for Russia because it facilitates the achievement of the following objectives (among others):

- facilitate reform in international monetary and financial system;
- enhance Russia's foreign policy multivector character;
- develop privileged bilateral relations with BRICS partners⁸⁷;

For Brazil, on the other hand, prior to the group's creation, former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim⁸⁸ affirmed, still in 2008, that Brazil, Russia, India and China were trying to consolidate a political bloc to help balance and democratize international order at the beginning of the 21st century. Prior to BRICS, Brazil also explored the formation of political associations such as IBSA (group composed by Brazil, India and South Africa, *3 of the 5 BRICS members*) to strengthen South-South cooperation and the country's international advocacy 'multilateralism' and plurality in world affairs (see point 3.1, Chapter 3). Since 2009, therefore, BRICS became yet another important political platform for Brazil, enabling the country, alongside other Regional and Great Powers, to voice their common dissatisfaction with the current IR structure.

In short, BRICS is also important for Brazil because it facilitates the achievement of the following objectives (among others):

- facilitate reform in international monetary and financial institutions;
- enhance the country's advocacy of multilateralism and plurality in world affairs;
- to counterpoise Western *hegemonism*, through concertation with emerging States

Rahim, S. Why is Russia angry? New Straits Times: 2019. URL: <<https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2019/12/548783/why-russia-angry?fbclid=IwAR0eAoJbHzXbxrLMIL79oRGiAF42U0o3dxeNyzAF5hn8KiILfSxW5V1LyxE>>

⁸⁴ *ibidem*

⁸⁵ Prior to BRICS, Russia worked alongside India and China since 2006 within the frameworks of the RIC group, considered to be a precursor for the BRICS itself.

⁸⁶ C O N C E P T OF PARTICIPATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN BRICS. URL: <<http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf>>

⁸⁷ *ibidem*

⁸⁸ Amorim, C. Os BRICS e a reorganização do mundo. Folha de São Paulo: 2008. URL: <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniaofz0806200807.htm>>.

2.2 BRICS APPROACH TO MULTIPOLARITY AND MULTILATERALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS

BRICS strength resides in the fact that the group (albeit composed by heterogeneous countries) pursues the common goal of *resisting a Unipolar system* dominated by the US, while seeking the consolidation of a more democratic multipolar world⁸⁹. That desire for democratization in world politics was therefore translated into an advocacy for multilateralism and multipolarity in international relations by the BRICS group since its first Summit in 2009.

In its first Declaration, BRICS stated their support «for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on [...] collective decision-making of all States»⁹⁰, demonstrating the group's consensus on the necessity for *multiple centers of power* within the system, and for the inclusion of a wider arrange of players in global decision-making processes. In 2011 Sanya's Declaration, BRICS emphasized that the world was «undergoing far-reaching, complex and profound changes, marked by the strengthening of multipolarity [representing a process in motion]»⁹¹, a perception reiterated in 2016's Goa's Declaration. Two years later, in 2018's Johannesburg's Declaration, the group stated that the UN Charter was the 'fundamental cornerstone' fostering cooperation and stability *in a multipolar order*⁹², apparently suggesting that multipolarity was indeed a reality in world politics.

In BRICS understanding, 'Unipolarity', or the outstanding power and privileges enjoyed by the United States in the system after the end of the Cold War, is viewed negatively. As Neorealists put it «international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced with unbalanced power, some States try to increase their own strength or they *ally with others* to bring the international distribution of power into balance»⁹³, an observation that goes in line with BRICS attitude when it comes to setting political coordination between *Regional Powers* such as Brazil, India and South Africa and *Great Powers* such as Russia and China in order to oppose 'Unipolarity' in world affairs.

Apart from 'multipolarity' itself, BRICS also emphasizes the importance of 'multilateralism' and 'multilateral institutions' in providing political/diplomatic solutions for acute problems of international life. In BRICS case, a strong emphasis has always been placed on

⁸⁹ Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions.

⁹⁰ BRIC. Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders. Russia: 2009. URL: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/209>>

⁹¹ BRICS. Sanya Declaration. China: 2011. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>>

⁹² BRICS. 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration. South Africa: 2018. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>>

⁹³ Waltz, K. Structural Realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41, p.28

«multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats»⁹⁴, thus reaffirming the group's commitment to the UN System. The declaration of 2010 in Brasilia kept the same tone, without substantial changes in the discourse. In Sanya's Declaration of 2011, BRICS asserted the group's role in «enhancing multilateralism and promoting greater democracy in international relations»⁹⁵, pointing to the group's active contribution towards multilateralism in international affairs, and not its support on a rhetorical level.

During the Fourth BRICS Summit's Delhi Declaration, BRICS stated their readiness to work with all countries on the basis of «international law and multilateral decision making»⁹⁶, defending the strengthening of «multilateral approaches on issues pertaining to global peace and security»⁹⁷ within the frameworks of the UN and its Security Council. In Delhi's Declaration, for instance, the world 'multilateral' appeared 9 times in the final document, in comparison to 5 times in the previous summit. One year later, the novelty of eThekweni's Declaration was BRICS reiteration of UN' role «as the foremost multilateral forum [...] [and] the center of global governance and multilateralism»⁹⁸, while at the same time emphasizing their commitment to work within the UN System in order to «strengthen multilateral approaches in international relations based on the rule of law»⁹⁹, demonstrating the growing importance of the concept of 'multilateralism' for the group. In eThekweni's Declaration the world 'multilateral' appeared 11 times in the final document, in comparison to 9 times in the previous summit.

During the 6th BRICS Summit's in Fortaleza (Brazil), BRICS pointed to the wide international recognition of the group's commitment to international law and multilateralism, while providing a great contribution to global peace and economic stability¹⁰⁰. In Fortaleza's Declaration, by its turn, the world 'multilateral' appeared 16 times in the final document, in comparison to 11 times in the previous summit. From 2015 to 2017, BRICS declarations would not bring, however, significant additions to the overall discourse on multilateralism of previous reunions.

⁹⁴ BRICS. 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration. South Africa: 2018. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>>

⁹⁵ BRICS. Sanya Declaration. China: 2011. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>>

⁹⁶ BRICS. Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration. India: 2012. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>>

⁹⁷ *ibidem*

⁹⁸ BRICS. eThekweni Declaration. South Africa: 2013. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>>.

⁹⁹ *ibidem*

¹⁰⁰ BRICS. The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration. Brazil: 2014. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>>

In 2018, by its turn, the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg's Declaration was the first one to bring a section named 'Strengthening Multilateralism, Reforming Global Governance and Addressing Common Challenges' where the group expressed their commitment once more to the «strengthening of multilateral institutions of global governance»¹⁰¹, with the word 'multilateral' appearing some 19 times throughout the final document, the biggest number so far in comparison to all previous summits. The very last BRICS summit, which happened in Brasilia in 2019, would bring in its final declaration a whole new section named 'Strengthening and reforming the multilateral system', where the group declared their intention to help «overcome the significant challenges currently facing multilateralism»¹⁰², in an implicit allusion to the growing trend of economic protectionism and unilateral decisions being taken by established powers, especially the US, that in recent times had undermined international stability.

2.3 BRICS VIEW ON THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As mentioned in the first Chapter, of the most criticized mechanisms of global governance in recent years has been the United Nations Security Council and the UN System in general. BRIC's 2009 first Declaration affirmed «the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN with a view to making it more efficient»¹⁰³ with the first mention about a possible reform that would also include the UN's Security Council coming only in 2011 Sanya's Declaration in China. Subsequently, further BRICS declarations had both Russia and China formally recognizing the 'importance attached' to Brazil and India in international affairs, while supporting their aspiration «to play a greater role in the UN»¹⁰⁴, but without specifying whether Moscow and/or Beijing acquiesced to their bid for permanent membership at the UNSC (more on this on Chapter 3).

In the 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration in 2014, however, the group recalled for the first time the 2005's World Summit Outcome Document, in which all UN members manifested their support for an «early reform of the Security Council in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and

¹⁰¹ BRICS. 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration. South Africa: 2018. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>>

¹⁰² BRICS. 11th BRICS Summit – Brasília Declaration. Brazil: 2019. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/21084-11th-brics-summit-brasilia-declaration>>

¹⁰³ BRIC. Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders. Russia: 2009. URL: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/209>>

¹⁰⁴ BRICS. Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration. India: 2012. Available at: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>>

the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions»¹⁰⁵, a demonstrative (albeit indirect) sign of BRICS acquiescence about the necessity to implement a reform at the UNSC in some capacity.

By 2016, on the other hand, BRICS openly recognized that the prevailing architecture of global governance was in fact «regulated by institutions which were conceived in circumstances when the international landscape in all its aspects was characterized by very different challenges and opportunities»¹⁰⁶, thus pointing to an overall perception of obsolescence regarding current mechanisms of global governance. In the last BRICS Summit held in Brazil in 2019, the group limited itself to repeat the same lines of previous documents, reaffirming «the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective, and efficient, and to increase the representation of the developing countries so that it can adequately respond to global challenges»¹⁰⁷, without, once again, specifying what countries could fit the role of candidates for permanent-membership.

On this note, some commentators contend that «the small nucleus of the Great Powers [contained within the Security Council as an example] maintains its centrality within the world political system, and it is still their decisions and conflicts that determine its dynamics, including the “windows of opportunity” open to [other] States»¹⁰⁸ not endowed with Great-Power attributes. Overall, BRICS declarations on UNSC reform are rather vague, *devoid of a clear consent* by Russia and China about Brazil’s and India’s¹⁰⁹ bid for permanent membership at the Council. That being said, without a consensus to be found in BRICS’s declarations regarding the Security Council reform, a structure that currently lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many countries, the advocacy for plurality on the world stage is slightly compromised, once the group loses an important opportunity for *openly supporting the candidacy* for permanent membership for countries such as Brazil and South Africa, which are strong representatives of their respective continents, South America and Africa.

In that regard, the acute differences in structural power at the UNSC enjoyed by both Russia and China might be the most influential factor behind BRICS vagueness about the issue.

¹⁰⁵ UNITED NATIONS. 2005 World Summit Outcome. URL: <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf>, p.32

¹⁰⁶ BRICS. eThekweni Declaration. South Africa: 2013. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>>

¹⁰⁷ BRICS. 11th BRICS Summit – Brasília Declaration. Brazil: 2019. Available at: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/21084-11th-brics-summit-brasilia-declaration>>

¹⁰⁸ Fiori, J.L. Formação, Expansão e Limites do Poder Global. Rio de Janeiro: 2004, p.30. URL: <<https://pt.scribd.com/document/155130423/09-FIORI-Jose-L-Formacao-Expansao-e-Limites-do-Poder-Global-pdf>>

¹⁰⁹ Stuenkel, O. BRICS e o Futuro da Ordem Global. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2017

2.4 BRICS VIEW ON THE BRETOON WOODS INSTITUTIONS

BRICS intend to «reform the obsolete international financial and economic architecture which does not take into account the increased economic power of emerging market economies and developing countries»¹¹⁰, a critique constantly leveled against organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. In effect, BRICS' desire «to change the financial architecture [...] in favor of developing countries»¹¹¹ was a side-effect of the 2008's Financial Crisis, which provoked considerable distrust about the norms and rules of the financial system ruled by the West, creating an opportunity for emerging countries to claim a bigger participation in the world's economic governance¹¹².

In its very first Joint Statement BRICS declared its commitment «to advance the *reform of international financial institutions*, so as to reflect changes in the global economy»¹¹³, changes represented by a shift in wealth and economic power to more States around the world. In addition, the 2009 declaration suggested that «the emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial institutions, whose heads and executives should be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process»¹¹⁴, an implicit criticism about how the Heads of both the World Bank and the IMF were selected.

For BRICS a 'merit-based selection process' should not consider a specific nationality (or nationalities) to occupy the top positions in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Indeed, according to critics, for an institution «to be credibly global, its top job cannot be permanently left in the hands of a European, however admirable some of those Europeans have been»¹¹⁵, which is exactly the case when it comes to the Heads of the IMF for instance. Due to this perception by BRICS countries about American and/or European occupation of high posts in

¹¹⁰ CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN BRICS. URL: <<http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf>>

¹¹¹ «В качестве общих интересов можно выделить [...] желание изменить финансовую архитектуру [...] в пользу развивающихся стран» (original in russian) Гиаккаглини, Ф. Д. В. Перспективы развития БРИКС после саммита в Форталезе: политико-экономическое положение стран-участниц, p.229. URL: <http://ee-journal.spa.msu.ru/vestnik/item/46_2014giaccaglini.htm>

¹¹² Maringoni, G; Ribeiro, J. O Banco e o Arranjo de Reserva dos BRICS em Perspectiva. Brazilian Journal Of International Relations, 2019, Vol.8, n.2. URL: <<http://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/bjir/article/view/8738>>

¹¹³ BRIC. Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders. Russia: 2009. URL: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/209>>.

¹¹⁴ *ibidem*

¹¹⁵ Wolf, M. Today and Tomorrow: To meet future challenges, the IMF must have strong backing from its members, p.8. URL: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/06/pdf/the-future-of-the-imf-wolf.pdf>

global financial institutions, the legitimacy of the Post-War economic order faces increasing criticisms¹¹⁶.

BRICS, moreover, openly declares that the IMF and the World Bank suffer from ‘legitimacy deficits’ and that «reforming these institutions’ governance structures requires first and foremost a substantial shift in voting power in favor of emerging market economies and developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their relative weight in the world economy»¹¹⁷, something to be achieved *via* proposals related to IMF’ Quota Reforms. With the group in favor of a «comprehensive review of the quota formula to better reflect economic weights»¹¹⁸, BRICS stands against the G7’s overrepresentation in terms of Quotas/Voting Shares at the IMF in comparison to their actual contribution to global economy (see point 1.2, Chapter 1).

BRICS also advises the leadership at the World Bank, part of the ‘Post-World War international economic order’ created by the developed countries of the North¹¹⁹, to make the institution respond to «the vision of all its members [...] [reflecting the] current economic and political reality»¹²⁰ of today’s world and not only reflect the point of view of its most powerful stakeholders. The World Bank, according to BRICS, should also *shift its focus from North-South cooperation* to equal partnership among its members, thus overcoming «an outdated donor-recipient dichotomy»¹²¹ and changing a historical top-down (rich State-poor State) dynamic that characterized projects of development undertaken by the bank. On this note, BRICS alluded to the asymmetric and unequal character present within the relationship between donor and recipient countries, pertaining to a North-South dynamic¹²².

Due to the afore-mentioned, after BRIC’s first formal summit in Yekaterinburg (Russia), the group readily laid out a plan for the creation of an investment bank to complement institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF¹²³. For that purpose, BRICS established in 2015

¹¹⁶ Acharya, A. Global Governance in a Multiplex World

¹¹⁷ BRIC. 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement. Brazil: 2010. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>>

¹¹⁸ BRICS. Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration. India: 2012. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>>

¹¹⁹ Tkachenko, S. International Political Economy. In: Tsvetkova, Natalia (Ed.), Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations, Lexington Books, 2017, pp.79-102

¹²⁰ BRIC. Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration. India: 2012. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>>

¹²¹ *ibidem*

¹²² Iglesias Puente, C.A. A Cooperação Técnica Horizontal Brasileira Como Instrumento da Política Externa: A Evolução da Cooperação Técnica Com Países Em Desenvolvimento – CTPD – No Período 1995-2005. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010. URL: <http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/715-Cooperacao_Tecnica_Horizontal_Brasileira_como_Instrumento_da_Politica_Externa_A.pdf>

¹²³ Labbé, S. Once Seen as Edging Out US Dominance, Do BRICS Still Hold Weight? OpenCanada.org: 2008. URL: <<https://www.opencanada.org/features/once-seen-edging-out-us-dominance-do-brics-still-hold-weight/>>

the New Development Bank (or NDB), whose goal is to finance sustainable development projects not only in member countries, but also in other emerging States of the system¹²⁴. Since its inception, the NDB has approved 23 loans totalizing some US\$ 5.7 billion to finance projects associated with renewable energy, transportation, infrastructure, sanitation etc¹²⁵. Brazil alone has been granted US\$ 1.41 billion for projects linked with renewable energy, environmental protection and sustainable urban infrastructure and transportation, while Russia was granted US\$ 1.668 billion for analogous projects and a US\$ 100 million loan for developing clean energy¹²⁶.

For some analysts, NDB's creation can be explained by BRICS' «dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform of existing institutions»¹²⁷, the main example of which represented by the lack of reform in favor of emerging countries at the IMF. According, for instance, to NDB's General Strategy document «the creation of the Bank is an expression of the growing role of BRICS and other emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) in the world economy, and their greater willingness to act independently in matters of international economic governance and development»¹²⁸, which translates to a general perception of the difficulty of *established institutions to better adequate/accommodate the interests of rising powers* within the system. In BRICS view, the NDB will then «supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development»¹²⁹, playing a complementary role to that of the Bretton Woods organizations created in 1944.¹³⁰

However, although not directly in defiance of the financial order established since the aftermath of World War II, the NDB is demonstrative of BRICS dissatisfaction about global economic decision-making residing within the hands of a handful of Western powers¹³¹. Moreover, differently from the practices of the IMF, the BRICS bank operates with no conditionality – be it political, social or otherwise - tied to its loans¹³², thus upholding the principle of ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of recipient countries.

¹²⁴ *ibidem*

¹²⁵ MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. New Development Bank Americas Regional Office. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/19253-escritorio-regional-das-americas-do-novo-banco-de-desenvolvimento-2>>

¹²⁶ NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Projects. URL: <<https://www.ndb.int/projects/list-of-all-projects/>>

¹²⁷ Acharya, A. Global Governance in a Multiplex World, 2017

¹²⁸ NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. NDB's General Strategy: 2017 – 2021. URL: <<https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/NDB-Strategy.pdf>>

¹²⁹ BRICS. Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration. India: 2012. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>>.

¹³⁰ Cozendey, C.M. Visão ou Miragem? Banco de Desenvolvimento e Arranjo de Reservas no Horizonte dos BRICS. In: BRICS Estudos e Documentos. Brasília: FUNAG, 2015, p.126

¹³¹ Maringoni, G; Ribeiro, J. O Banco e o Arranjo de Reserva dos BRICS em Perspectiva. URL: <<http://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/bjir/article/view/8738>>

¹³² Barone, B; Spratt, S. Development Banks from the BRICS. Institute of Development Studies, 2015

Instead of a simplified «one size fits all» formula for achieving economic development, as advocated by the IMF, NDB's projects are declared to be «tailored to individual country needs»¹³³, based on a «democratic decision-making and inclusivity of all stakeholders»¹³⁴, placing potential borrowers and the NDB at the same level of participation in common projects, promoting *a dialogue of equals*. NDB states for instance that «projects will be most successful when borrowing countries are in charge of their own development path»¹³⁵, without any pre-determined prescribing policy concerning regulatory and/or institutional reforms to be undertaken by borrowing countries.

Another interesting point surrounding the institution regards its shareholding and voting rights distribution. In NDB, all BRICS countries hold 20% of the Voting Shares each (see ATTACHMENTS), thus avoiding a situation where any one power could control the bank's operations and decision-making due to financial preponderance¹³⁶, a situation often quoted to be the case when it comes to the IMF and the World Bank for instance (see point 1.2, Chapter 1). If, on the other hand, the Voting Rights at the NDB were to follow the relative economic size of each BRICS' member in terms of GDP, China would then become the uncontested hegemon of the institution, holding 67% of all Voting Rights (see simulation in ATTACHMENTS). In short, NDB's declarations so far demonstrate that the institution wants to provide an alternative for the current architecture of world financial governance, while aimed not to replace the existing Bretton Woods organizations, *but to complement it*.

BRICS, in this way, demonstrates that the group is showing a non-hegemonic approach in terms of its own institutionalization, whereas keeping its original discourse and demonstration of dissatisfaction towards the Western dominance in Bretton Woods institutions, and towards the ways in which both the IMF and the World Bank operates. Finally, while, in Chapter 2, we have examined BRICS positions about the principal mechanisms of global governance established after the end of World War II, the third Chapter of our thesis will present Brazil's and Russia's individual stances on the current state of affairs in world politics.

¹³³ «A soberania dos países é primordial, e os projetos apoiados pelo banco são desenhados para as necessidades individuais dos países, respeitando suas prioridades para investimento» (full quotation original in portuguese) Maringoni, G; Ribeiro, J. O Banco e o Arranjo de Reserva dos BRICS em Perspectiva. Brazilian Journal of International Relations, 2019, Vol. 8, n. 2. URL: <http://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/bjir/article/view/8738>

¹³⁴ NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK [NDB]. Essence: Mission and Values. URL: <<https://www.ndb.int/about-us/essence/mission-values/>>

¹³⁵ NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. NDB's General Strategy: 2017 – 2021. URL: <<https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/NDB-Strategy.pdf>>, p.6, 11

¹³⁶ Bueno, E. The New Development Bank (NDB) in the Context of Global Governance Reform: Complementing the Efforts of existing institutions in financing infrastructure projects and sustainable development. *In: International Legal Aspects of BRICS*. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Editora D'Plácido, 2019, p.227

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S AND RUSSIA'S POSITIONS ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

For the most part, the current Chapter will rely methodologically on a *content analysis* of texts reproduced during speeches and discourses by political leaders, State officials and Ministers. We assume that most politicians indeed «possess unique worldviews and, therefore, [...] subjectivity affects decision-maker perceptions»¹³⁷ about a given country's national interests and position in the international system. We also agree as well that personal predispositions of any leader can be transformed into general guidelines for foreign affairs «because beliefs and motives [do] suggest ways of interpreting the environment»¹³⁸, therefore Heads of State «are likely to urge their governments to act in ways consistent with such images»¹³⁹, being hard to dissociate ideological upbringing with political action and conduct.

The discourses and countries' positioning concerning the topics scrutinized in this Chapter encompass the period between early 2000s up until 2018, thus excluding the most recent Brazilian government of Jair Bolsonaro. During that period, in Russia we had the presidencies of Vladimir Putin [2000-2008, 2012-2018] and Dmitry Medvedev [2008-2012], while in Brazil the country was governed by the Labors' Party headed by Luiz Inacio (Lula) da Silva [2003-2010] and Dilma Rousseff [2011-2016], followed, after Dilma's impeachment process in 2016, by a two-year presidential term by Michel Temer [2016-2018].

3.1 BRAZIL'S AND RUSSIA'S POSITIONS ON MULTIPOLARITY AND MULTILATERALISM

According to analysts, both Brazil and Russia *resent the existing US-dominated and inequitable world order*¹⁴⁰, while postulating the importance of multilateralism in international affairs to mitigate the effects of American unilateral acts in foreign policy. On the Brazilian side, the importance of multilateralism is a common theme often found within the country's political discourse. Former president Dilma Rousseff, for instance, once stated that Brazil is «a country that

¹³⁷ Berejikian, J.D. Model Building with Prospect Theory: A Cognitive Approach to International Relations. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec, 2002), pp. 759-786, p.778

¹³⁸ Hermann, M.G. Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 7-46, p.10

¹³⁹ *ibidem*

¹⁴⁰ Mazarr, M J et al. Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, p.20. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html>

believes in multilateralism as the most efficient way to produce stable international consensus»¹⁴¹, the logic being that, if operating within a strong multilateral system, Brazilian foreign policy can mitigate the impact of [Great] power politics¹⁴².

Brazil also manifested its support for multilateralism in world affairs within the frameworks of different political associations such as the IBSA forum (composed by Brazil, India and South Africa in 2003¹⁴³), whose declarations affirm the country's commitment to multilateralism and to a multilateral system of international politics. Without a strong military/nuclear back-up Brazil focused on 'multilateral solutions' for international problems, supporting the strengthening of rules and institutions of Global Governance¹⁴⁴ to achieve its national interests. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (between 2013-2014) Luiz Alberto Figueiredo stated once that by principle and for achieving Brazil's national interests, the country favors the 'deconcentration of power' in IR, a process that requires the strengthening of multilateralism in world affairs¹⁴⁵.

Likewise, Russia also seeks «the strengthening of principles of multilateralism in international affairs»¹⁴⁶, with the term 'multilateralism' often found in a number of governmental documents, such as the Foreign Policy Concept for instance. The rhetoric importance given by both States to 'multilateralism' in world affairs, be it in political discourse or in official documents, is thus reinforced by statements done by BRICS, where the group jointly affirms their commitment

¹⁴¹ «Nós somos, sem dúvida nenhuma, um país que acredita no multilateralismo como forma mais eficiente de produzir consensos estáveis em âmbito internacional» (original in portuguese) Rousseff, D. Discurso da Presidenta da República, Dilma Rousseff, por ocasião da cerimônia de formatura da turma 2012-2014 do Instituto Rio Branco e de imposição de insígnias da Ordem de Rio Branco – Brasília: 2014. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/5903-discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-durante-cerimonia-de-formatura-da-turma-2012-2014-do-instituto-rio-branco-e-de-imposicao-de-insignias-da-ordem-de-rio-branco-brasilia-30-de-abril-de-2014>>

¹⁴² Stuenkel, O. "Com Bolsonaro, política externa se tornou uma caixa de surpresas". Deutsche Welle: 2019. URL: <<https://www.dw.com/pt-br/com-bolsonaro-pol%C3%ADtica-externa-se-tornou-uma-caixa-de-surpresas/a-49407488>>

¹⁴³ That Dialogue Forum between three important multiethnic democracies focused its efforts on political coordination within the developing world, providing an important platform through which Brazil affirmed its support for a more inclusive global governance.

¹⁴⁴ Flemes, D. O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança? Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 2010, Vol. 53

¹⁴⁵ Figueiredo, L.A. Palestra Magna do Ministro Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado por ocasião da III Conferência sobre Relações Internacionais, UnB – Brasília, 27 de novembro de 2014. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/6089-palestra-magna-do-sr-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores-por-ocasio-da-iii-conferencia-sobre-relacoes-internacionais-unb-brasilia-27-de-novembro-de-2014>>

¹⁴⁶ THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2008. URL: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>>

to multilateral diplomacy, with the United Nations playing a central role in dealing with global challenges and threats¹⁴⁷.

Beyond multilateralism, on the other hand, the concept of ‘multipolarity’ in international politics is one also often present in Brazil’s and Russia’s political discourse and documents. When visiting Russia in 2002, for instance, former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso stated that both countries defended a multipolar [world] order, based on equality between States and the value of the United Nations¹⁴⁸, a statement that resonated well with authorities in Moscow. More recently, Brazil and Russia also promised to promote a more democratic and just ‘multipolar international order’, based on the primacy of multilateralism¹⁴⁹ aforementioned in previous paragraphs.

However, is Brazil’s and Russia’s interpretation of ‘multipolarity’ one and the same?

For Russia, since early 2000s the country’s foreign policy strategy consists in avoiding *the consolidation of a unipolar world* under US domination, based on the redistribution of world power by new emerging poles¹⁵⁰. [Vladimir] Putin’s foreign policy became oriented to oppose the concept – as well as the realization - of a unipolar order based on American hegemony¹⁵¹, while building up the conditions for the establishment of a multipolar world¹⁵² reflecting its civilizational diversity¹⁵³. In effect, perhaps one of the most emblematic [and more evident] criticisms towards unipolarity in Russian political discourse came in 2007, during Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in Germany, when the Russian president delivered the following speech: «the history of mankind surely knows periods of unipolar dominance and the desire for world domination. [...] However, what is a unipolar world? No matter how this term is decorated, it ultimately means, in practice, only one thing: it represents one center of authority, one center of power, one center of decision-making. This is the world of one master, one sovereign. And this is ultimately fatal not only for everyone who is within this framework, but also for the sovereign

¹⁴⁷ BRIC. 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement. Brazil: 2010. URL: <<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>>.

¹⁴⁸ Cardoso, F.H. Discurso Do Senhor Presidente Da República, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Por Ocasão Da Cerimônia De Assinatura De Atos. Moscou, 14 de janeiro De 2002. URL: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_biblioteca/resenhas_peb/Resenha_N90_1Sem_2002.pdf, p. 36

¹⁴⁹ Declaração Conjunta da Federação da Rússia e da República Federativa do Brasil sobre Diálogo Estratégico em Política Externa. Itamaraty: 2017, 4. URL: <<https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/detalhamento-acordo/11994?>>

¹⁵⁰ Freire, M.R. As Eleições Presidenciais Na Rússia: Continuidade Na Mudança. Portugal: 2008. URL: <https://estudogeral.sib.uc.pt/jspui/bitstream/10316/9605/1/MRFreire_OccasionalPaper32_IPRI_2008.pdf>

¹⁵¹ Dugin, A. Geopolítica da Rússia Contemporânea. Lisboa: Instituto de Altos Estudos em Geopolítica e Estudos Auxiliares, 2016

¹⁵² Lagutina, M. L.; Vasilyeva, N. Eurasian Economic Union in the Russian Foreign Policy, 2017, p. 313

¹⁵³ FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2000. URL: <<https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>>

itself, because it destroys him from the inside»¹⁵⁴, a declaration that had much to do with Russia's resentment about its weakened position during the 1990s, when the world was experienced an Unipolar *momentum* under the auspices of the US.

Russia has in fact several grievances towards the US other than the current sanctions imposed by the West in connection with the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis, sufficing to mention for instance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]'s expansion during late 1990s and early 2000s bringing Western military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders¹⁵⁵. During the 1990s, with the dissolution of the USSR, Russia left its position as a world power, experiencing a dramatic reduction in its international prestige, a shock for a country that for centuries had been accustomed to playing a major role in world politics¹⁵⁶. In Putin's era, however, Russia tried to regain its historic role as a global player, that is, a country with global interests and capacity to influence world politics¹⁵⁷. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly *acknowledged itself as a Great Power*, one deserving of recognition in the international arena.

In fact, Moscow's interests at the international level, according to its National Security Concept, consist in securing the country's position as a Great Power and one of the most influential centers of a multipolar world¹⁵⁸. When it comes to academic assessments, authors such as Buzan and Wæver also classify Russia as a Great Power, alongside the European Union (EU), China and Japan, while still considering the US as a Superpower. Their classification of Great Power is relative to States «responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power [...] They [*the Great Powers*] will generally think of themselves as more than Regional Powers [...] and they will usually be capable of operating in

¹⁵⁴ «История человечества, конечно, знает и периоды однополярного состояния и стремления к мировому господству. [...] Однако что же такое однополярный мир? Как бы ни украшали этот термин, он в конечном итоге означает на практике только одно: это один центр власти, один центр силы, один центр принятия решения. Это мир одного хозяина, одного суверена. И это в конечном итоге губительно не только для всех, кто находится в рамках этой системы, но и для самого суверена, потому что разрушает его изнутри». Путин, В. Выступление и дискуссия на Мюнхенской конференции по вопросам политики безопасности. Мюнхен: 2007. URL: <<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>>

¹⁵⁵ Bezerra, V. OTAN segundo a visão russa: percepções de um “novo cerco”. *Revista de Geopolítica*, 2019, Vol. 11, nº 1, p. 105-116. URL:<<http://revistageopolitica.com.br/index.php/revistageopolitica/article/view/271>>. In 1999 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO. In 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria made the same move.

¹⁵⁶ Segrillo, Â. A Diarquia Putin-Medvedev: Dimensões da Política Interna e da Política Externa. In: ALVES, Andre Augusto De Miranda Pinelli (org.). *Uma Longa Transição: Vinte Anos de Transformações na Rússia*. Brasília: IPEA, 2011, pp.137-154

¹⁵⁷ Paranhos, C.A. *Uma Longa Transição: Vinte Anos de Transformações na Rússia*. Brasília: IPEA, 2011

¹⁵⁸ NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: 2000. URL: <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768>

more than one region»¹⁵⁹, which can be demonstrated by Russia's involvement in Ukraine in 2014 (within the Post-Soviet space) and Syria (in the Middle-East) from 2015 onwards.

In effect, Putin's foreign policy became more assertive thanks to Russia's growing economic might in the first decade of the 2000s, at a time of significant increase in the prices of oil and gas prices in international markets¹⁶⁰. Concomitantly, Russia's traditionally strong defense industry became once again, as during the Soviet era, «one of the most important components of [Russia's] position as a power of global significance»¹⁶¹ underpinning the country's 'independent role in international politics'. Being one of the system's Great Powers, frequently on Foreign Policy Documents, Russia mentions its support for 'multipolarity' in regard to Moscow's desired world order, constantly pointing out to the 'emergence of a multipolar international system'¹⁶².

However, since 2008's Foreign Policy Concept, alongside the term 'Multipolarity', Russia also used, in official documents, the concept of 'Polycentricity', mentioning a trend towards a 'polycentric world order' based on the economic growth of a number of countries and regions that increased their political influence in the system¹⁶³. In 2013, Moscow acknowledged that IR was in a «process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system»¹⁶⁴ characterized by a «decentralization of the global system of governance»¹⁶⁵, with 'regional governance' emerging as its basis, due to new centers of 'economic growth' and political power. Those new centers, according to Moscow, were assuming increased responsibility for their respective regions, culminating in processes of regional integration in different parts of the world¹⁶⁶. This *polycentric Russian view of IR*, in theory, could place Brazil as one such center of 'economic power' responsible for integrational processes in South America.

Having briefly discussed Russia's position concerning multipolarity (as well as the concept of polycentricity), we shall then scrutinize Brazil's own understanding of 'Multipolarity' and the associations made by politicians and government officials regarding the term. First of all,

¹⁵⁹ Buzan, B; Wæver, O. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.36

¹⁶⁰ Oldberg, I. *Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev*. Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2010. URL: <<http://www.ui.se/upl/files/44240.pdf>>

¹⁶¹ Connolly, R. *Russia's Response to Sanctions: How Western Sanctions Reshaped Political Economy in Russia*. Valdai Papers: 2018. URL: < <https://valdaiclub.com/files/21144/>>, p.7

¹⁶² THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2016. URL: <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248>

¹⁶³ THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2008. URL: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>>

¹⁶⁴ THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2013. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186>

¹⁶⁵ *ibidem*

¹⁶⁶ *ibidem*

when it comes to academic assessments, Brazil is identified for instance as a *Regional Power*, according to Buzan and Wæver's classification, meaning States whose capabilities «loom large in their regions, but do not register much in a broad-spectrum way at the global level [...] They are thus excluded from the higher-level calculations of system polarity whether or not they think of themselves as deserving a higher ranking»¹⁶⁷, a trait somewhat representative of Brazil's historical quest for recognition *vis-à-vis* the international community (see point 3.2, CHAPTER 3).

On the other hand, according to analysts, the 'hegemonic stabilizing role' of Brazil in South America helps to explain that continent's most stable character in comparison to other regions of the world¹⁶⁸, with the country representing a *de facto* 'regional unipole'. On this note, «among the permanent objectives of Brazilian foreign policy is the strengthening of relations with the countries of Latin America, with which the country intends to forge economic, political, social and cultural integration»¹⁶⁹ as stated in Brazil's Constitution. Brazil, therefore, exercises its *regional hegemony* through processes of institutionalization and efforts aimed towards regional integration¹⁷⁰, such as the Mercosur and Unasur. The former represents the Southern Common Market, an integration project founded by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991, originally intended to provide: 1) the free movement of goods and services through the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions; 2) the establishment of a *common external tariff and commercial policy* in relation to other States, while coordinating positions in regional and international economic-commercial forums. In 2014 for instance, the Mercosur Heads of State reaffirmed the bloc's role as a political, economic, social and cultural space, *promoting multipolarity* and a more just and solidary world¹⁷¹.

¹⁶⁷ Buzan, B; Wæver, O. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.37

¹⁶⁸ Fuccille, A; Rezende, L. *Complexo Regional de Segurança da América do Sul: Uma Nova Perspectiva*. Contexto Internacional: Rio de Janeiro, vol. 35, no 1, janeiro/junho 2013, p. 77-104. URL: <<http://www.scielo.br/pdf/cint/v35n1/a03v35n1.pdf>>

¹⁶⁹ «Entre os objetivos permanentes da política externa brasileira encontra-se o adensamento das relações com os países da América Latina, com os quais se pretende forjar uma integração econômica, política, social e cultural» (original in portuguese). Iglesias Puente, C.A. *A Cooperação Técnica Horizontal Brasileira Como Instrumento da Política Externa: A Evolução da Cooperação Técnica Com Países Em Desenvolvimento – CTPD – No Período 1995-2005*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010. URL: <http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/715-Cooperacao_Tecnica_Horizontal_Brasileira_como_Instrumento_da_Politica_Externa_A.pdf>

¹⁷⁰ *ibidem*

¹⁷¹ MERCOSUL. Documentos aprovados na XLVI Cúpula de Chefes de Estado do MERCOSUL e Estados Associados – Caracas, 29 de julho de 2014. URL: < <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/5768-documentos-aprovados-na-xlvi-cupula-de-chefes-de-estado-do-mercosul-e-estados-associados-caracas-29-de-julho-de-2014>>

Unasur (or South American Community of Nations), on the other hand, was created in 2008 with 12 signatory States¹⁷² with a view to unify all the South American economies and to promote the cultural, economic, social and environmental development of the continent. That being said, *a Brazilian understanding of multipolarity* (as expressed by former president Dilma Rousseff) *slightly differs from the Russian one*, taking into account the South American continent as a whole, and as a ‘sovereign and prosperous region’ capable of playing a relevant and active role *in a multipolar world*¹⁷³, overcoming its historical stigma of being passive object of international relations. In that way, once a non-participant of the Great Power club, Brazil associates its political weight with the whole of South America, thus entertaining the thought of having *the continent itself as a pole of a multipolar world order*, something to be achieved through the consolidation of processes of integration within the region.

3.2 BRAZIL AND RUSSIA’S POSITIONS ON THE REFORM OF THE UNSC

According to a Brazilian diplomat, rotative members of the UNSC are at most in the background of deliberative decisions of the organ, a stigma shared by entire continents such as South America (home to 430 million people) and Africa (home to 1.24 billion people, or 17% of the world’s population)¹⁷⁴. On this note, the most recent Joint Communiqué by IBSA in 2018 stated that «no reform of the United Nations will be complete without the reform of the Security Council»¹⁷⁵ by expanding its permanent and non-permanent members, providing an adequate representation for developing countries. Additionally, within the frameworks of IBSA, India, South Africa and Brazil manifested their support for each other’s candidacies for permanent membership in a reformed and enlarged UNSC¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷² Being: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

¹⁷³ Rousseff, D. Discurso da Presidenta da República, Dilma Rousseff, por ocasião do encontro da Clinton Global Initiative - Rio de Janeiro, 09 de dezembro de 2013. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/presidenta-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/4689-discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-durante-encontro-da-clinton-global-initiative-rio-de-janeiro-rj-09-12-2013>>

¹⁷⁴ Sloboda, P.M; Val, E.M. Revisitando o Novo Multilateralismo Latino-Americano e seu Impacto na Reforma do Conselho De Segurança Das Nações Unidas. URL: <http://190.242.99.229/index.php/Vialuris/article/view/587/pdf_40>

¹⁷⁵ MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IBAS Dialogue Forum – Joint Communiqué (New York, 27/09/2018). Available at: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/19563-ibas-dialogue-forum-joint-communicue-new-york-27-09-2018>>

¹⁷⁶ *ibidem*

In fact, according to a former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs «it is a feature of Brazilian foreign policy to defend [...] the greater participation of a larger number of actors in Global Governance»¹⁷⁷, which includes naturally the UNSC itself. At least since the Labor Party came to power and following a consistent economic growth witnessed between 2003 and 2008, even prompting the periodic *The Economist* to conclude that the country was finally taking off, Brazil's main goal in foreign policy became the obtainment of a permanent seat at the UNSC¹⁷⁸.

This quest for recognition at the world stage «has long been an integral part of Brazil's global strategy»¹⁷⁹ with the country's international standing greatly depending on how it is perceived by other States in the system. This quest, however, is not entirely new in Brazilian history. As an example, during Artur Bernardes' Government (1922-1926) in early 20th century, Brazil placed its bid for *permanent membership at the League of Nations Council*, in order to elevate the country's international status to one equivalent of the European Great Powers¹⁸⁰. The League's Council was by that time composed by four permanent members: France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, whose task also included the settlement of international disputes¹⁸¹, much alike today's UNSC. Brazil, in particular, was originally among its first 4 non-permanent members, alongside Belgium, Greece and Spain¹⁸², a position nevertheless considered to be 'secondary' for the country.

Back to the present day, in order to press for reform at the UNSC, Brazil, Japan, Germany and India established in 2011 a political association known as the G4. During that time, the search for a *higher status in international affairs* was «one of the most visible features of Brazilian foreign policy, manifested in ambitious diplomatic initiatives»¹⁸³ and political concertation between the country and different Regional Powers. In their first official Ministerial

¹⁷⁷ «É uma característica da atuação da política externa brasileira a defesa da transparência e da maior participação de um número maior de atores na governança global» (original in portuguese). Vieira, M. Discurso do Ministro Mauro Vieira em Audiência Pública da Comissão de Relações Exteriores e de Defesa Nacional da Câmara dos Deputados. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/9752-discurso-do-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-em-audiencia-publica-da-comissao-de-relacoes-exteriores-e-de-defesa-nacional-da-camara-dos-deputados-15-de-abril-de-2015>>

¹⁷⁸ Barbosa, R. A Política Externa do Brasil para a América do Sul e o Ingresso da Venezuela no Mercosul.

¹⁷⁹ Casaroes, G. Leaving the Club Without Slamming the Door: Brazil's Return to Middle-Power Status, pp. 89-110. In: ESTEVES, P *et al.* Status and the Rise of Brazil: Global Ambitions, Humanitarian Engagement and International Challenges. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p.89

¹⁸⁰ Garcia, E.V. Entre América e Europa: A Política Externa Brasileira na Década de 1920. Brasil: Universidade de Brasília (UnB), 2006

¹⁸¹ UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA (n/d). History of the League of Nations (1919-1946). URL: <[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/36BC4F83BD9E4443C1257AF3004FC0AE/%24file/Historigal%20overview%20of%20the%20League%20of%20Nations.pdf](https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/36BC4F83BD9E4443C1257AF3004FC0AE/%24file/Historigal%20overview%20of%20the%20League%20of%20Nations.pdf)>

¹⁸² LEAGUE OF NATIONS. The Covenant of the League of Nations. Yale Law School. URL: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp> (1920, Art 4º)

¹⁸³ Casaroes, G. Leaving the Club Without Slamming the Door: Brazil's Return to Middle-Power Status, p.91

Meeting at the sidelines of 2011's UN General Assembly, the G4 States affirmed their willingness to take on major responsibilities in world affairs, postulating their inclusion as permanent members of an expanded UNSC, in order to make it «truly reflective of current geopolitical realities»¹⁸⁴, therefore enhancing its representativeness and legitimacy¹⁸⁵. Since its inception, G4 representatives have met regularly on the sidelines of UN assemblies, not only on the level of Ministries, but also on the level of Heads of State, as happened in 2015 for example. In that opportunity, the group declared that more States «have the capacity and willingness to take on major responsibilities with regard to maintenance of international peace and security»¹⁸⁶, a task that should not be restricted within the hands of the 5 permanent-members of the UNSC alone.

Previous Brazilian Ministers of Foreign Affairs such as Jose Serra, who served from 2016 to 2017, and Aloysio Nunes, who occupied the post between 2017 and 2019, also pointed out to the changes occurred in the international system since the end of the World War II, while the UNSC kept its composition intact. Serra, for instance, comments that «the UN Security Council still has a core membership that reflects the world of 1945 [...] the incorporation of new permanent members, could be beneficial to all. It could break the current stalemate that prevents us to solve many of the problems and crises that continue to threaten international peace»¹⁸⁷, with countries such as Brazil, India, Japan and Germany bringing new approaches and views to an institution whose composition remains frozen for more than 7 decades.

Russia, on the other hand, as a permanent member of the UNSC, does not necessarily share the same haste towards its reform. On a rhetorical level, Russia indeed recognizes the importance of making the Security Council «more representative as part of a reasonable UN reform»¹⁸⁸ even suggesting the inclusion of new permanent members, «first of all, authoritative

¹⁸⁴ G4. Ministerial Meeting of the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan): Joint Press Statement. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/9657-ministerial-meeting-of-the-g4-countries-brazil-germany-india-and-japan-joint-press-statement-february-11-2011>>

¹⁸⁵ The group also suggests the inclusion of ten more members, six permanent (with no veto power at first) and four non-permanent (with a two-year non-renewable mandate), while also advocating for the inclusion of two African States to be defined.

¹⁸⁶ G4. Meeting of the Leaders of the G4 – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – on the Reform of the UN Security Council – Joint Statement – September 26, 2015. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/11923-meeting-of-the-leaders-of-the-g4-brazil-germany-india-and-japan-on-the-reform-of-the-un-security-council-joint-statement-september-26-2015>>

¹⁸⁷ Serra, J. Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs José Serra on the occasion of the G4 Ministerial Meeting – New York: 2016. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs-speeches/14777-statement-by-minister-of-foreign-affairs-jose-serra-on-the-occasion-of-the-g4-ministerial-meeting-new-york-21-september-2016>>

¹⁸⁸ FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2016. URL: <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248>

developing countries»¹⁸⁹, as stated in its Foreign Policy Concept. On the one hand, Russia underlined in 2017 its support for Brazil «as a strong and deserving candidate for a permanent membership of a reformed UN Security Council»¹⁹⁰, a declaration that hasn't found its way into BRICS documents yet¹⁹¹.

Russia, by its turn, requires that «any decisions to expand membership in the UN Security Council should be based on the broadest possible agreement among UN member States»¹⁹², while keeping the status of the permanent members and their immutable right to veto intact. For Russia, countries willing to change the configuration of the UNSC (such as Brazil and India) must «understand that it is uneasy to implement such a reform and that all the structural and procedural changes should be made gradually and in a cautious way»¹⁹³, a sign that Moscow could decelerate any initiatives towards a UNSC reform that runs contrary to its understanding of what 'cautious' or 'gradual' change means.

3.3 BRAZIL'S AND RUSSIA'S VISION ON WHAT BRETOON WOODS INSTITUTIONS REPRESENT

Having managed to repay their debts to the West during early 2000s, Brazil and Russia raised from *a position of weakness to one of confidence*, inspiring politicians in both capitals to look for an improvement of their countries' status within the global financial architecture. In Brazil's point of view, it is considered that the country could only grow economically during the beginning of the 21st century due to the payment of its debt to the IMF, provided it no longer had to accept its policies and recommendations¹⁹⁴.

¹⁸⁹ FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2000. URL: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>

¹⁹⁰ «A Rússia reitera seu apoio ao Brasil como forte e merecedor candidato a membro permanente de um Conselho de Segurança da ONU reformado» (original in portuguese). Declaração Conjunta da Federação da Rússia e da República Federativa do Brasil sobre Diálogo Estratégico em Política Externa. Itamaraty: 2017, 7. URL: <<https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/detalhamento-acordo/11994?>>

¹⁹¹ Despite two subsequent Summits: in Johannesburg in 2018 and Brasilia last year.

¹⁹² Declaração Conjunta da Federação da Rússia e da República Federativa do Brasil sobre Diálogo Estratégico em Política Externa. Itamaraty: 2017, 7. URL: <<https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/detalhamento-acordo/11994?>>

¹⁹³ SERGUNIN, A. Theorizing BRICS: Critical Perspectives. In: International Legal Aspects of BRICS. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Editora D'Plácido, 2019, p.103

¹⁹⁴ Rousseff, D. Discurso da Presidente da República, Dilma Rousseff, por ocasião da reunião de chefes de Estado e de Governo do Encontro Iberoamericano de Alto Nível em Comemoração do Ano Internacional dos Afrodescendentes – Salvador: 2011. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/4667-discurso-no-encerramento-da-reuniao-de-chefes-de-estado-e-de-governo-do-encontro-iberoamericano-de-alto-nivel-em-comemoracao-do-ano-internacional-dos-afrodescendentes-salvador-19-11-2011>>

On a different note, while delivering a speech at the UN, the former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff would also draw attention to the imperative of eliminating «the disparity between the growing importance of *developing countries* in the global economy and their *insufficient representation* and participation in the decision-making processes of international financial institutions»¹⁹⁵, a position that reflected the country's view about the situation involving the lack of legitimacy of the IMF and the World Bank. In effect, one of the guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy, among others present within its Constitution, is to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries¹⁹⁶.

Additionally, while within the frameworks of IBSA, Brazil (alongside India and South Africa) declared that the IMF's reform «must effectively reduce the serious imbalance between the ample majority of voting power now held by *advanced economies* and the unsatisfactory participation of developing countries»¹⁹⁷ an observation that implicitly opposes the 'developing countries' in the *Global South* and the 'advanced economies' of the *Global North*. IBSA countries indeed identify themselves as belonging to a 'Global South community'¹⁹⁸, corresponding to the peripheral (and/or semi-peripheral) regions or countries within the world capitalist economy. Formerly known as the Third World, countries in the Global South are loosely associated to Latin America, Africa and even parts of Asia, while also representing a metaphor for social exploitation and economic exclusion experienced throughout their historical relationship with the core capitalist nations of the system, or to put it simply the Global North.

Indeed, since Lula's government (2003-2010), Brazil reinvigorated its political contacts with Latin American, African and Asian countries¹⁹⁹ on the Global South. On a practical

¹⁹⁵ Rousseff, D. Speech by President Dilma Rousseff on the occasion of the General Debate of the 69th General Assembly of the United Nations – New York: 2014. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/speeches-articles-and-interviews/president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-speeches/5836-statement-by-the-president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-dilma-rousseff-at-the-general-debate-of-the-69th-general-assembly-of-the-united-nations-new-york-september-24th-2014>>

¹⁹⁶ Iglesias Puente, C.A. A Cooperação Técnica Horizontal Brasileira Como Instrumento da Política Externa: A Evolução da Cooperação Técnica Com Países Em Desenvolvimento – CTPD – No Período 1995-2005. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010. URL: <http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/715-Cooperacao_Tecnica_Horizontal_Brasileira_como_Instrumento_da_Politica_Externa_A.pdf>

¹⁹⁷ IBSA. 1st IBSA Summit Meeting: Joint Declaration. URL: <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/images/1st_summit_declaration.pdf>

¹⁹⁸ IBSA. India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum Third Summit of Heads of State/Government New Delhi Declaration. URL: <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/images/3rd_IBSA_Summit_Declaration_-_New_Delhi_2008.pdf>

¹⁹⁹ Iglesias Puente, C.A. A Cooperação Técnica Horizontal Brasileira Como Instrumento da Política Externa: A Evolução da Cooperação Técnica Com Países Em Desenvolvimento – CTPD – No Período 1995-2005. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010. URL: <http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/715-Cooperacao_Tecnica_Horizontal_Brasileira_como_Instrumento_da_Politica_Externa_A.pdf>

level, exemplifying the country's proactivity in demonstrating the *growing importance of emerging economies to global financial governance*, Brazil (together with India and South Africa) established in 2004 the IBAS Fund to provide financial support to human development projects and the fight against poverty and hunger in developing countries. That project was considered by IBSA as a «unique initiative to enhance South-South cooperation», providing an alternative framework for global financial governance.

Apart from practical initiatives of the kind discussed above, there is a common understanding in many States that processes of globalization contributed to the worsening in wealth inequality around the world, benefiting a small economic elite in developed countries in detriment of the developing ones²⁰⁰, while at the same time the cooperation received by countries in the Global South (be it through the IMF and otherwise), using the expression of former [Brazilian] Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim, was usually 'given with one hand and taken away with the other'²⁰¹. Southern countries, like those in Latin America and Africa, share similar *socioeconomic and cultural characteristics* and their cooperation (as within the frameworks of IBSA) is in essence devoid of the aspects of domination and dependence that usually characterize North-South relationship²⁰², be it under the auspices of the IMF or the World Bank.

Russia, in turn, joined the IMF and the World Bank only in 1992 after the collapse of the USSR, being integrated into the world's key economic institutions led by the West²⁰³. During the 1990s, however, Moscow was severely dependent on Western economic help, having inherited *all the debt of the former Soviet Union* (composed by its 15 original republics), a sum estimated in approximately US\$ 56.5 billion. It was only in 2006 that Moscow managed to pay off all of its debt to the West (more precisely to a group of countries known as the Paris Club²⁰⁴), thus achieving its long-desired financial independence. With *confidence regained* due to the country's significant economic growth during early 2000s, Russian authorities started to voice their support for a

²⁰⁰ Bezerra, V. Globalization and Its Effects: A Discussion on Brazil and Its Cultural/Political Gravitation Towards The US. *Revista Conjuntura Global* v. 9, n. 1 (2020), pp.1-18 .URL: <<https://revistas.ufpr.br/conjglobal/article/view/69911>>

²⁰¹ Amorim, C. Discurso do Ministro Celso Amorim por ocasião da abertura da "Global South-South Development Expo 2010" – Genebra, 22 de novembro de 2010. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/9900-discurso-do-ministro-celso-amorim-por-ocasio-da-abertura-da-global-south-south-development-expo-2010-genebra-22-11-2010>>

²⁰² Iglesias Puente, C.A. A Cooperação Técnica Horizontal Brasileira Como Instrumento da Política Externa: A Evolução da Cooperação Técnica Com Países Em Desenvolvimento – CTPD – No Período 1995-2005. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010. URL: <http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/715-Cooperacao_Tecnica_Horizontal_Brasileira_como_Instrumento_da_Politica_Externa_A.pdf>

²⁰³ Mearsheimer, J. The Rise & Fall of the Liberal International Order. URL: <https://ndisc.nd.edu/assets/288231/rise_and_fall_of_the_liberal_international_order.september_11_2018.pdf>

²⁰⁴ A group of 19 developed nations in total, including most of the western European and Scandinavian countries, the US, the UK and Japan.

reorganization of global financial governance, based on claims by a bigger number of States whose economic emergence entitled them to play a greater role in the decision-making process²⁰⁵ of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Concomitantly, Russia turned into one of the main proponents of the need to *replace the Bretton Woods system*²⁰⁶ by a fairer, less-Western centric model of financial global governance.

In comparative terms, contrary to *Brazil's paradigm of North-South relations* embedded within the relationship between developed and developing countries, Russia interpreted the Bretton Woods institutions within *the frameworks of an East-West divide* and on the Western predominance/hegemony in world affairs. On this note, in early 2000s, Russia for instance denounced the establishment of a unipolar structure of IR based on «the economic and power domination of the United States»²⁰⁷, while in reality the West was irreversibly losing its monopoly due to the rising of new centers of economic/political power within the system²⁰⁸. On this note, in 2013 Russia observed that global power, once within the confines of a handful of Western States, became «more dispersed and [...] [while] shifting to the East, [and] primarily to the Asia-Pacific region»²⁰⁹, a trend that alluded to the growing economic [as well as political] importance of Asia in international affairs, culminating in the erosion of the traditional dominance of the West²¹⁰.

In that vein, while Brazil favored, prior to BRICS, political associations such as IBSA that worked *within the frameworks of the Global South*, at the same time identifying the West and Western-tailored institutions (Bretton Woods included) as representatives of the Global North, Russia, on the other hand, preferred to strengthen its ties with Asian countries (especially China) at the beginning of the 2000s in order to counterpoise the Western hegemony in world affairs (again embedded within organizations such as the IMF and World Bank), within a more familiar - to Moscow - *framework of an East-West divide*. All those nuances in views and positions upheld by both Brazil and Russia discussed in Chapter 3 demonstrate that, although participants of BRICS, each country has its own way of interpreting the topics of *common concern* for the group.

²⁰⁵ Lavrov, S. World at a Crossroads and a System of International Relations for the Future. Russia in Global Affairs: 2019. URL: <<https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/World-at-a-crossroads-The-future-system-of-international-relations-20199>>

²⁰⁶ Гиаккаглини, Ф. Д. В. Перспективы развития БРИКС после саммита в Форталезе: политико-экономическое положение стран-участниц, p.229. URL: <http://ee-journal.spa.msu.ru/vestnik/item/46_2014giaccaglini.htm>

²⁰⁷ FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2000. URL: <<https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>>

²⁰⁸ THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2008. URL: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>>

²⁰⁹ THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2013. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186>

²¹⁰ THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2016. URL: <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/2542248>

CONCLUSION: BRICS' VIEWS *VIS-À-VIS* BRAZIL'S AND RUSSIA'S POSITION

BRICS is a group whose inception was highly motivated by a desire to provide a counterbalance to *Western (and ultimately American) hegemonism* in international affairs. On a global perspective, today's prevailing order is «focused on establishing and promoting alternatives to the U.S.-led and Western dominated»²¹¹ institutions of governance, while, in the words of former Brazilian president Michel Temer, the world is in need of «more legitimate and effective international decision-making bodies»²¹² to better represent the increasing importance of emerging economies (as those represented by BRICS prior to its inception).

However, there are some important political nuances when it comes to the *BRICS positioning* on relevant aspects of global governance in comparison to the national perspectives of its member countries. The current thesis, therefore, aimed to present an overview of how BRICS statements (analyzed in Chapter 2) on *the current problems* surrounding international mechanisms of global governance, mainly those established right after World War II (as discussed in Chapter 1) and surviving to this day, could slightly differ from Brazil's and Russia's individual interpretations and views on those same problems (as seen in Chapter 3).

As a starting point about how BRICS interpretations could *slightly differ from each member-country's view* about common principles of international life, we could mention the different nuances given by the group, as well as by both Brazil and Russia individually, to aspects such as the importance of 'Multilateralism' in world affairs and the meaning of 'Multipolarity'. BRICS underlines the relevance of multilateral diplomacy in IR as a means to oppose American and/or Western unilateralism in solving acute problems that should, instead, be handled by peaceful and diplomatic means. Meanwhile, the group interprets the rise of multipolarity as a process captained mainly by emerging [economic] powers.

Brazil, for its part, sees multilateralism as a means to mitigate Great Power politics (once the country does not have the material attributes to qualify as a Great Power), while promoting multipolarity as a 'democratization' of world politics and placing especial emphasis to

²¹¹ Mazarr, M J *et al.* Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html>

²¹² «Precisamos de instâncias decisórias internacionais mais representativas e, portanto, mais legítimas e eficazes». (original in portuguese) Temer, M. Discurso do presidente da República, Michel Temer, durante reunião de líderes do BRICS. China: 2016. URL: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/14732-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-michel-temer-durante-reuniao-de-lideres-do-brics-hangzhou-china-4-de-setembro-de-2016>>

South America' role in a multipolar world, and not only of Brazil in particular. Russia, on the other hand, while endowed with the attributes of a Great Power (represented by its military might and nuclear-State status), sees itself as one of the necessary poles of a multipolar world, whereas 'multilateralism' in Russian official documents is regularly associated with the importance of the UN and especially the Security Council' role in solving acute problems of international life, something to be expected given the country's position as its permanent member.

Speaking about *the Security Council*, whereas BRICS indeed considers its reform as a necessary step (within a broader UN reform to be undertaken), so far only Brazil and India are more *actively pushing for a fundamental redistribution of powers* within that mechanism, while Russia and China feel 'essentially reluctant' towards hastened modifications in the status-quo²¹³. As argued by a Brazilian diplomat, while endowed with a privileged position in the UN institutional structure, Russia (as well as China) «will not approve any change affecting such a prominent position»²¹⁴, thus representing an obstacle to an urgent expansion of UNSC's permanent membership. IR Theory, by its turn, could be *punctually* used to help us explain this difference in views.

According to IR Theory, States are usually classified as being either status-quo, revisionist or reformist powers; *Status-quo powers* are generally associated with States whose main concern is to maintain their position/privileges/prerogatives in the system; meanwhile, States dissatisfied with their place in world affairs are often labelled *revisionists*, willing to change, in a significant and sometimes radical way, the rules and norms that govern the system to their own benefit; whereas *reformist powers*, albeit also dissatisfied with their place in the overall scheme of things (as revisionist States do), prefer to act on the basis of existing rules/norms, once advocating for gradual reform through negotiations and diplomatic means²¹⁵.

BRICS declarations regarding the Security Council can be considered as *reformist* in essence, *albeit vague in substance*, whereas Russia's individual position on the matter best fits the category of a *status-quo power*, in contrast to Brazil's more *reformist* approach. BRICS recognizes the need to reform the Security Council, although in its declarations the group does not explicitly mention the bids of Brazil (and India) for permanent membership of that mechanism. Brazil, on the one hand, does not contest the rules and norms surrounding the Council's operation and it is

²¹³ Stuenkel, Oliver. BRICS e o Futuro da Ordem Global

²¹⁴ «Tais membros não aprovarão qualquer mudança que afete tal posição destacada» (original in portuguese) Sloboda, P.M; Val, E.M. Revisitando o Novo Multilateralismo Latino-Americano e seu Impacto na Reforma do Conselho De Segurança Das Nações Unidas, p.188.

²¹⁵ Sergunin, A. Theorizing BRICS: Critical Perspectives. In: International Legal Aspects of BRICS. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Editora D'Plácido, 2019

worth noting that both the G4's as well as IBSA's proposals for the addition of new members to the UNSC does not involve suppression of veto power from the Big Five, nor does it suggest that the new members be given veto power right after their acceptance²¹⁶. As things stand, the UNSC continues to alienate a great number of countries in the international community, representing an outdated configuration of power that dates back to the aftermath of World War II. Russia, by its turn, even though considering the addition of new permanent members to the Council as an important step in reforming that institution, is unwilling to proceed and/or support any major hastened changes at the Council.

In the case of Bretton Woods institutions, BRICS, for its part, criticizes its excessive "Westernness", manifested for instance by the selection process for the Heads of the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the lack of sufficient representation/Voting Power held by emerging economies *vis-à-vis* the G7. With the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2015, BRICS expected moreover «to influence the international financial architecture and global practices by being a fundamentally *new kind of development institution* based on mutual respect and reflecting the evolution of the world economy in recent decades»²¹⁷, based on the increasing role of emerging economies²¹⁸.

Another point of contention and criticism towards Bretton Woods institutions regards the policy recommendations of the IMF to borrowing countries. Under the auspices of the IMF, borrowing States have to fulfill certain requirements and criteria established by the Fund, which sometimes involves the adoption of harsh austerity economic measures. Brazilian authorities, in particular, hold unpleasant memories about the times the country was indebted to the Fund, while Russia, on the other hand, also experienced a difficult situation of economic dependence in relation to the West during the 1990s, while transitioning from its previously [Soviet] State-led economy to a market-oriented one.

Within the 2000s, both Brazil and Russia managed to repay their debts, subsequently forming the BRICS group in order to counterbalance the *Western over-influence in international affairs*, especially represented by the latter's privileged position at the Bretton Woods organizations. For Brazil, in particular, the IMF and the World Bank should provide a bigger voice

²¹⁶ Sloboda, P.M; Val, E.M. Revisitando o Novo Multilateralismo Latino-Americano e seu Impacto na Reforma do Conselho De Segurança Das Nações Unidas

²¹⁷ NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK (2017). NDB's General Strategy: 2017 – 2021. URL: <<https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/NDB-Strategy.pdf>>, p.26

²¹⁸ NDB promises "a new mindset of partnership", engaging "in a dialogue of equals" with its borrowers and putting the recipient countries in "charge" of their development projects. NDB also promises to be a non-prescriptive institution, respecting other countries' sovereignty in order to achieve their sustainable development goals.

and representation to developing economies in managing global financial governance, and the country holds (as demonstrated by political discourse and documents) an interpretation of those institutions *within a South-North framework*, whereas the North is comprised by advanced capitalist economies whose historical dominance jeopardize the development of countries pertaining to the Global South, generally associated with Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia.

Russia, on the other hand, pointed out, in its Foreign Policy Concepts, to attempts by Western States to *hold on to its hegemonic position* in international relations (represented for instance by the privileges enjoyed by the US and its allies at Bretton Woods institutions), while interpreting the ‘Western’ decline in terms of legitimacy and authority in world affairs within an *East-West divide*. Russia, therefore, joined forces with countries such as India and (especially) China during the 2000s in order to better counterpoise the West and strengthened its political ties with the East through bilateral, trilateral (as in the case of the RIC group) and plurilateral initiatives.

To sum up, after all the discussions here presented, expectations are that the current thesis might have provided some necessary as well as relevant insight into how Brazil’s and Russia’s positioning within BRICS interrelates with, and in some aspects slightly differentiate from, global and, especially, national perspectives on important topics associated to global governance. We, nevertheless, recognize that the present work has a number of **limitations**. Firstly, the use of political discourse from different leaders *as representing the official position of a State* on any given issue of IR, albeit analytically useful, can sometimes constitute an abstract extrapolation of reality. Secondly, not always what is written in official documents (be it intentions, aspirations, aims), as well as in different primary sources extensively used throughout this work, can be *implemented in practice*. Finally, *the lack of clear definition* regarding some terms and concepts used by BRICS, as well as by Brazil and Russia individually, sometimes hinders the comparative approach undertaken by our research.

We also point out to the necessity of **further research** regarding the prospects for ‘Brazil-Russia political relations’ within and outside BRICS, considering Brazil’s new foreign policy orientation implemented by Jair Bolsonaro’s government. As observed elsewhere, «changes in domestic politics [in any of the member-States] may limit the development of the BRICS association»²¹⁹, and Brazil’s current political instability does bring concern to all of the remaining BRICS members.

²¹⁹ «Изменения во внутренней политике могут ограничивать рамки развития объединения БРИКС» (original in Russian) Гиакagliни, Ф. Д. В. Перспективы развития БРИКС после саммита в Форталезе: политико-

In effect, contrary to Brazil's diplomatic traditions of *privileging multilateral solutions to global problems*, Jair Bolsonaro's government places emphasis on bilateralism²²⁰ in order to promote the country's national interests. Moreover, Bolsonaro's ideological like-mindedness with [the US President Donald] Trump *seats uneasily with BRICS's support for a more democratic and multipolar world order*. Russia, by its turn, rightfully observed the importance of «a firm political will on the part of [the] governments of the participating States to deepen [BRICS] cooperation»²²¹, requiring that all BRICS countries work in unison to the consecution of their shared objectives and goals.

Nevertheless, however uncertain the prospects for Brazilian-Russian cooperation may be in the foreseeable future, the author of this thesis expects that both countries continue to work productively based on a principled relationship, and regardless of the difference in views on certain aspects of global governance previously discussed, not only through BRICS but also in a wider range of international fora. To this end, Russia's promise (made in 2008) to «establish a strategic partnership with Brazil»²²² should be fully implemented, not only within the frameworks of BRICS, but also by strengthening their contacts in another spheres as well, such as commerce, cultural/humanitarian exchange, tourism, scientific and technological cooperation, education, etc. However, a certain disappointment arises from the fact that Brazil was barely mentioned in Russia's most recent Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, demonstrating that there is still a *long way to go for both countries to consolidate their full potential of cooperation*. Nevertheless, optimistically the continuous political interaction between Brazil and Russia within BRICS can still provide future opportunities for a more creative bilateral exchange, once, as stated by former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso «the imagination of our peoples is as vast as the spaces that they inhabit»²²³, regardless of how distant we are situated in the world map.

экономическое положение стран-участниц, 2014, p.248. URL: <http://ee-journal.spa.msu.ru/vestnik/item/46_2014giaccaglini.htm>

²²⁰ PARTIDO SOCIAL LIBERAL. O Caminho da Prosperidade: Proposta de Plano de Governo Bolsonaro 2018. Brasília: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2018. URL: <http://divulgacandcontas.tse.jus.br/candidaturas/oficial/2018/BR/BR/2022802018/280000614517//proposta_1534284632231.pdf>

²²¹ CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN BRICS. URL: <<http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf>>

²²² THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Kremlin: 2008. URL: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>>

²²³ «A imaginação de nossos povos é tão larga quanto o espaço de que dispõem» (Original in portuguese). Cardoso, F.H. Discurso do Senhor Presidente Da República, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Na Cerimônia De Recebimento Do Título De Doutor Honoris Causa Da Universidade De Moscou. Moscou, 14 de janeiro De 2002. URL: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_biblioteca/resenhas_peb/Resenha_N90_1Sem_2002.pdf>, p.38

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
ATTACHMENTS

Figure 1 – Josef Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Yalta Conference
(The dawn of the formulation of the Post-War international order. The Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain would afterwards become permanent members of the Security Council)



SOURCE: AFP

Figure 2 – International delegation of economic experts at Bretton Woods (US) in 1944
(Bretton Woods would give birth to institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, the pillars of global financial governance)



SOURCE: Reuters

Figure 3 – First BRIC Summit in Yekaterinburg (Russia) in 2009
(After the Financial Crisis, BRIC countries would get together to voice their dissatisfaction with the current state of Global Governance)



SOURCE: The Guardian

Figure 4 – Last BRICS Summit in Brasilia (Brazil) in 2019
(Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil's new President elected in 2018, would host his first BRICS Summit in Brazilian territory. In 2019 BRICS completed 10 years of existence)



SOURCE: DW

Figure 5 – G4 Meeting of Heads of State in 2015
(During the Labor Party's years of government [2003-2016], Brazil used political associations such as the G4 and IBSA to present itself as a strong candidate to play a bigger role globally)



SOURCE: CNBC

Figure 6 – Vladimir Putin during the Munich Conference on International Security in 2007
(In the opportunity, the Russian president would lay down a harsh criticism against Unipolarity and American hegemony in world affairs)



SOURCE: BBC

Table I – UNSC number of members *vis-à-vis* UN total members

YEAR	UN MEMBERS	UNSC SEATS	% OF UNSC SEATS/UN MEMBERS
1945	51	11	21%
1965	117	15	13%
2019	193	15	8%

SOURCE: United Nations. URL: <<https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html#1960s>>

Table II – G4 Meetings



Meetings	Date
G4 Meeting of the Foreign Ministers - New York	September 21, 2017
G4 Meeting of the Foreign Ministers - New York	September 21, 2016
G4 Ministerial Meeting - New York	July 11, 2016
G4 Meeting of the Leaders – New York	September 26, 2015
G4 Ministerial Meeting – New York	July 04, 2014
G4 Ministerial Meeting – New York	September 25, 2012
G4 Ministerial Meeting - New York	September 25, 2012
G4 Ministerial Meeting – New York	February 11, 2011

SOURCE: (Brazilian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018

Brazil's Years of Membership at the Security Council:

1946 to 1947

1951 to 1952

1954 to 1955

1963 to 1964

1967 to 1968

1988 to 1989

1993 to 1994

1998 to 1999

2004 to 2005

2010 to 2011

SOURCE: UN. URL: <<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/brazil>>

Table III – IMF Voting Shares and Quotas

COUNTRY	Quotas	Voting Shares (%)	Place in World Economy (GDP)	Place in World Economy (GDP by PPP*)	% of Global GDP	% of Global GDP by PPP*
US	17.46	16.52	1 (20.5 trillion USD)	2 (20.5 trillion USD)	23,8	15.2
Japan	6.48	6.15	3 (4.97 trillion USD)	4 (5.6 trillion USD)	5.79	4.16
China	6.41	6.09	2 (13.6 trillion USD)	1 (25.3 trillion USD)	15.85	18.7
Germany	5.60	5.32	4 (3.99 trillion USD)	5 (4.37 trillion USD)	4.65	3.24
France	4.24	4.03	6 (2.77 trillion USD)	10 (2.96 trillion USD)	3.23	2.20
United Kingdom	4.24	4.03	5 (2.82 trillion USD)	9 (3 trillion USD)	3.29	2.24
Italy	3.17	3.02	8 (2 trillion USD)	12 (2.39 trillion USD)	2.41	1.77
India	2.76	2.64	7 (2.72 trillion USD)	3 (10.4 trillion USD)	3.17	7.69
Russia	2.71	2.59	11 (1.65 trillion USD)	6 (4.17 trillion USD)	1.93	3.09
Brazil	2.32	2.22	9 (1.86 trillion USD)	8 (3.37 trillion USD)	2.17	2.49
Canada	2.32	2.2	10 (1.71 trillion USD)	17 (1.85 trillion USD)	1.99	1.37

*Purchasing Power Parity

SOURCES: IMF, URL: <<https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx>> - World Bank, URL:

<<https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>> - Statisticstimes, URL:






<<http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-gdp-ppp.php>>

Table IV – IMF Voting Shares and Quotas: A comparison between G7 and BRIC

Group	Quotas	Voting Shares (%)	Nominal GDP	GDP by PPP*	% of Global GDP	% of Global GDP by PPP*
G7	43.51	41.27	(38.76 trillion USD)	40.67 trillion USD	45.16	30.18
BRIC	14.2	13.54	(19.83 trillion USD)	43.24 trillion USD	23.12	31.97

*Purchasing Power Parity/SOURCES: IMF, World Bank, Statisticstimes. Table elaborated by the author

Table V – Share Holding and Voting Rights at the NDB

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF SHARES	SHARE HOLDING (% OF TOTAL)	VOTING RIGHTS (% OF TOTAL)
 BRAZIL	100,000	20	20
 RUSSIA	100,000	20	20
 INDIA	100,000	20	20
 CHINA	100,000	20	20
 SOUTH AFRICA	100,000	20	20

SOURCE: NDB, URL: <<https://www.ndb.int/about-us/organisation/members/>>

Table VI – BRICS countries' voting rights at NDB if based on each State's GDP (as of 2018)

COUNTRIES	GDP	Simulated Voting Rights Based on GDP
China	\$13.41 trillion	67%
India	\$2.72 trillion	13.6%
Brazil	\$1.87 trillion	9.35%
Russia	\$1.63 trillion	8.15%
South Africa	\$ 0.36 trillion	1.8%

SOURCE: Elaborated by the author